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Abstract
Three Essays on Remittances, Institutions,
and Economic Development
Durga Gautam
Does the inflow of remittances affect the quality of institutions in the recipient coun-
tries? This question is important because economists have stressed that good economic
institutions, particularly those in the public sector, are instrumental for economic develop-
ment and growth. The literature on remittances, however, does not document a thorough
analysis and compelling evidence of the relationship between these private financial transfers
and institutional quality. Unlike other kinds of international capital flows, remittances in-
flows are not mediated by the government of recipient countries. Remittances are not taxed
directly and so are not a source of revenue for the government. Then a natural question first
arises, namely what mechanism explains the relationship, if any, between remittances and
the quality of domestic governance?
Given the substantial size and impressive growth of remittances to many developing coun-
tries, we investigate the effects of these income transfers on domestic institutions. Studies
show that remittances are most likely to influence the incentives faced by households and the
government. So inflows of remittances can be a potential factor to affect institutional quality
through their effects on private and public investment. In this dissertation, we examine the
effects of remittances on political institutions, financial inclusion, and entrepreneurial envi-
ronment in the recipient countries. We use either cross-sectional or panel data depending
on the particular measure of institutional quality. Although we employ both parametric
and nonparametric methods, we primarily focus on recently advanced kernel regression that
allows nonlinearity and heterogeneity in partial effects of remittances. The results of our
empirical study provide strong evidence of a causal relationship between remittances and
the quality of domestic institutions. The rise in remittances, however, is not found to have
a uniform impact on institutional quality across all countries or over time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The massive increase in cross-border movement of nationals has led to a remarkable growth
of global remittances over the last three decades. Remittances now exceed receipts from
export earnings and financial inflows of foreign direct investment for many countries (World
Bank, 2014). As a key resource of foreign capital in the balance of payments, remittances
have outpaced official development assistance and remained more stable than private debt
and portfolio equity flows over past several years (see Kapur and McHale, 2005; International
Monetary Fund, 2010). Though the effects of global trade and international capital flows
on domestic institutions and national policy choices have been studied extensively in the
literature (e.g. Quinn, 1997; Rodrik, 1998; Garrett, 2001; Rudra, 2002; Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian, 2003; Rickard, 2012), no such scrutiny has been witnessed with regard to
international remittance flows.
Recently, researchers have come to recognize remittances as one of the dominant sources
of income and foreign exchange for many developing countries. The growing importance of
remittances has stimulated a great deal of discussion among scholars and policymakers. In
particular, remittances studies have been taken up by the officials of multilateral institutions,
by those working with non-governmental organizations and on behalf of migrant communi-
ties, and by social scientists including development economists and anthropologists (Grabel,
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2008). From macroeconomic perspective, new growth theories have profoundly altered the
direction for research on the impact of remittances. While previous research was centered
on the short-run effects, focus gradually shifted to long-run considerations, notably the role
of remittances on recipient countries′ economic growth and long-run performance (Rapoport
and Docquier, 2004). With this new perspective, and since the positive effect of modern
institutions on economic development has been an established empirical proposition, some
researchers have begun to highlight and investigate the relationship between remittances
inflows and domestic institutions in the context of developing countries. This dissertation
research attempts to contribute to this aspect of literature on remittances.
There is no reason to disagree that remittances enhance the resource base for both recipi-
ent households as well as the recipient country government. Remittances can be expected to
increase consumption as well as investment expenditure in the recipient countries. Several
studies show that remittances reduce poverty, increase investment in education and health-
care, foster financial development and entrepreneurship, and boost economic growth. But
given that remittances are purely private familial transfers, most of these favorable outcomes
appear to come from the motivation and financial activities of households, and not directly
from the enhanced role of the government in the economy.
Then, the crucial questions are the following: are the governments in the recipient coun-
tries induced to curtail their expenditures on public goods and services as households receive
much in remittances? Do remittances deteriorate the quality of domestic institutions, includ-
ing the ones in the public sector? As remittances are found to enhance financial resources
of households, do they promote financial inclusion in the recipient economies? Furthermore,
by effecting both suppliers and demanders of financial services, do remittances help prosper
entrepreneurial environment? In this dissertation, we principally address these relevant but
relatively ignored issues in the remittances literature. We do so by conducting empirical
studies while we emphasize the use of recently advanced econometric approaches, including
nonparametric kernel regression methods.
2
1.1 Remittances: A brief outline
What makes remittances a matter of particular concern to policymakers? Why do these
private transfers deserve scholarly attention? The idea that remittances have become a
major form of international capital flows have fundamentally shifted academicians′ attention
from other forms of capital flights to remittances flows. Also, as remittances differ from other
flows in key respects, their potential macroeconomic impacts on the recipient economies could
be largely different. This is likely to add a new development perspective to the policy-making
process in the context of developing countries.
We now briefly outline the major characteristics of remittances. The first impression one
receives from remittances literature is of the large absolute size and growth of remittances
during the last three decades. Remittances have become a significant source of external
financing for developing countries, emerging as their second largest source of net financial
flows over the past two decades. The total volume of remittances to developing countries
in the mid-1990s was US$50 billion. This size increased to US$125.8 billion in 2004, to
US$251 billion in 2007, and to US$401 billion in 2012. Remittances to developing countries
are projected to reach US$454 billion in 2015. Global remittances flows, including flows to
higher-income countries, are expected to follow a similar pattern, rising from US$582 billion
in 2014 to US$608 billion in 2015. (World Bank, 2008, 2014; McHale and Kapur, 2005).
Figure 1.1: Financial resources flows to developing countries
Source: Migration and Development Brief, 2014, World Bank
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In terms of their significance in the balance of payments, workers′ remittances (a major
part of aggregate remittances) exceed both official aid and non-FDI private capital inflows
to developing countries. They are consistently trended up since 1998 up to date, except
during 2006-2007. Figure 1.1 presents a comparative graphical picture of remittances and
other international capital flows to developing countries for the last fifteen years. In 2013,
remittances were more than three times larger than official development assistance (ODA).
Moreover, workers′ remittances have displayed much less variability than other balance of
payments flows. Remittance flows are also significantly larger than total foreign direct invest-
ment to developing countries, excluding China. As remittances are a more stable component
of receipts in the current account, they reliably bring in foreign currency that helps sustain
the balance of payments and dampen gyrations (World Bank, 2008).
Overall, examination of the stylized facts based on the aggregate quantity of workers′ re-
mittances reveals remittances′ relative global macroeconomic importance. Flows of workers′
remittances have been growing consistently over time and now represent the second-largest
balance of payments inflow to developing countries. Their relative stability versus that of
other inflows to developing countries may provide additional macroeconomic benefits in terms
of reduced volatility of output and consumption. These stylized facts hold with cross-country
remittances data as well as with an aggregate series (Chami et al., 2008).
We have observed that remittances have grown rapidly in absolute terms, their growth is
significant relative to other forms of financial flows, and they have emerged as the most stable
source of financial flows that is proven to be unaffected by economic and political shocks.
There are still other three characteristics of remittances that deserve special attention. First,
remittances are “unrequited transfers” means that unlike other financial flows such as debt
and equity flows, there are no counter claims by the sender, such as principal repayments
and interest charges in the case of debt flows and profit repatriations in the case of equity
flows. So, if one is interested in the financial bottom line, remittances were clearly the
most important source of net foreign exchange flows to developing countries (Kapur and
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McHale, 2005). Second, remittances are counter-cyclical meaning that they tend to rise
during economic downturns. This contrasts with other international private flows that tend
to be strongly pro-cyclical. This makes remittances a form of self-insurance in developing
countries. Finally, remittances are purely private non-market familial transfers that bypass
the state and official aid bureaucracies. This attribute is particularly important to skeptics
of the state and aid bureaucracies. As several controversies remain regarding other types of
international capital flows, remittances flows are becoming an increasingly important part
of the financial landscape of many developing countries (Grabel, 2008).
1.2 Theories on remittances and institutions
A survey of literature on remittances shows that most studies in remittances tend to be
rather narrow and microeconomic in scope. These studies have remained unable to discern
remittances within a broader political economy context. Only a few researchers have at-
tempted to analyze the effects of remittances from a more macroeconomic perspective. In
the 1970s and 1980s, this line of research was centered on the short-run effects of remittances,
mainly within the framework of static trade models. But once new growth theories were ad-
vanced, the direction of research on the impact of remittances have been profoundly altered.
The focus gradually shifted to long-run considerations, notably the role of remittances in
dynamics of inequality, finance, entrepreneurship, and development (Djajic, 1986; Barham
and Boucher, 1998; El-Sakka and McNabb, 1999; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001; Ratha, 2003;
Rapoport and Docquier, 2004; Grabel, 2008; Yang, 2011).
Researchers consider remittances as mostly altruistic in nature and take remittance trans-
fers as gifts, grants or donations. The obvious motivation to remit is simply to care of those
left behind: spouses, children, parents, and members of larger kinship and social circles
(Rapaport and Docquier, 2004; United Nations Development Program, 2011). However, the
government response to such philanthropic supports at national level can shrink the size
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of public services. Remittances may reduce the role of insurer of last resort often played
by governments in developing countries (Ebeke, 2011). Kapur and Singer (2006) conduct
an empirical analysis that explicitly shows that inflow of remittances reduces government
spending in developing countries.
Some scholars consider the inflow of remittances as a form of economic rent (see Ross
2001; Kapur and McHale, 2005). Kapur and McHale argue that remittances constitute a
form of rents at the national level. They discuss that governments may remain reluctant to
devise institutional reforms in favor of growing remittance inflows. It is because exporting
products requires painstaking effort to build the institutions and infrastructure but exporting
people, on the other hand, occurs in most cases by default rather than by design.
The relationship between the receipt of worker′ remittances and institutional quality is
not as straightforward, and is considered as a complex and overlooked phenomenon. Political
incentives in less democratic regimes tend to substitute resources from the provision of public
goods to the supply of patronage (e.g. corruption) to derive greater utility (Ahmed, 2013).
Ahmed shows that governments in less democratic, non-oil producing Muslim countries are
found to optimally choose to reduce their provision of welfare goods as households receive
more remittances. The results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in remittances
raises corruption by 1.5 index points (on a 6-point scale), thereby deteriorating the quality
of governance.
Regarding the impact of remittances on state behavior, Grabel (2008) opines that gov-
ernments throughout the developing world have dismantled long-standing programs that
provided at least some assistance to small firms and agriculturalists. State support for
education and public health has also been curtailed radically. So it seems possible that
remittances will allow countries to ignore the social and economic needs of their desperate
regions and communities. It is, therefore, important to investigate whether remittances cre-
ate a form of what we can term a “public moral hazard” on the part of developing country
governments.
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Abdih at al. (2012) empirically verify that remittances are curse and cause a decline in
the quality of political institutions. They develop a model of public goods provision in the
presence of non-taxable remittances to show how remittances can lead to increasing share of
funds for the government′s own purposes diverted from public goods provision, even though
remittances do not provide a direct source of revenue for the government. They argue that
remittances act as a buffer between the government and its citizens and, therefore, give rise
to a moral hazard problem. This leads the government to free ride and expropriate more
resources for its own purposes, rather than channelizing these resources to the provision of
public services.
Besides political institutions, there are few other institutional dimensions that remittance
scholars have paid attention but to a little extent. These dimensions encompass financial
inclusion, and business regulations and entrepreneurial environment in the recipient coun-
tries (Ashby and Seck, 2012; Anzoategui et al., 2013). Financial inclusion is the process
that ensures people in a country have access to the financial services and products offered
by the formal financial institutions. On the supply side, financial inclusion requires the ex-
istence of a sound financial system operated under an effective regulatory framework. In
such environment, appropriate financial products and services could be collectively offered
to all segments of the population within an economy. In most developing countries, how-
ever, financial services are only available to a minority of population. Mainstream for-profit
financial institutions have largely ignored the segment of the market that includes the low
income and poor households, as well as small- and medium-sized enterprises, often called
the “missing middle”(United Nations, 2006).
The studies show that formal financial institutions in developing countries have turned
their limited attention away from small business and agriculture and toward the kinds of
speculative activities that have flourished in the era of financial liberalization. Therefore,
formal financial institutions have also been released of their state-mandated obligations to
provide support to small business and agriculture. It is likely that financial institutions
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may continue to ignore the social and economic needs of their most desperate regions and
communities. On the other hand, it is also plausible that efforts to capture the blooming
remittance market will eventually cause formal financial institutions to respond to their small
customers (Grabel, 2008).
There is also no consensus regarding the effects of remittances on entrepreneurship, but
no studies explicitly examine its impacts on business environment. Some empirical studies
indicate a positive relationship between remittances and domestic investment (e.g., Woodruff
and Zenteno, 2001) while others find a negative outcomes (e.g., Chami et al., 2003). A
remittance-receiving country′s state of financial development may cause remittance receipts
to have an important influence on the domestic entrepreneurial activities. When a country′s
domestic financial system is poorly developed, a large number of households are rationed
out of formal credit markets, because the cost of providing credit to them is prohibitively
high. Such households are therefore unable to initiate business endeavors. The arrival of
remittances allows them to undertake these projects (Chami et al., 2008).
In this dissertation, in addition to the impact of remittances on governance, we explore
the relationship between remittances and financial inclusion, and between remittances and
entrepreneurial environment. We investigate whether the inflow of remittances serve as a
means to promote financial inclusion and whether it enhances the level of entrepreneurial
environment in the recipient countries.
1.3 An overview of the dissertation
We begin the study of remittances and its potential impact on institutional quality by first
addressing the following question: through what channel and to what extent does the inflow
of remittances affect the quality of governance in the recipient countries? Recent studies
suggest that a rise in remittances reduces public goods provision. Scholars generally agree
that remittances increase consumption expenditure of the recipient households. In Chap-
8
ter 2, we try to combine these two strands of literature and investigate whether inflows of
remittances help or hurt the quality of domestic governance. This chapter identifies remit-
tances as a potential factor to affect the incentives faced by households and the government
in remittance-receiving economies. With respect to household behavior, our results indi-
cate that a rise in remittances is associated with an increasing demand for private goods
but a decreasing share of public goods in household consumption. Concerning government
motivation, we find a significant negative association between remittances and government
consumption expenditure. This critical result implies that remittances induce the govern-
ment to substitute the provision of public goods for remittances. Our empirical study,
therefore, provides the evidence of governmental free-riding on public goods provision in the
presence of remittances. Using recently advanced kernel regression methods, we find that
this substitution of resources occurs in a nonlinear fashion across countries; and leads to
higher government corruption, deterioration of rule and law, and inferior regulatory quality;
thereby causing a loss in public welfare.
In Chapter 3, we examine the impact of remittances on financial inclusion. The role of
inclusive finance is crucial for development as the limited access to finance for the large seg-
ment of population prevents them from integrating into the economy. We analyze whether
remittances affect the demand for deposit instruments and the extent of using deposit in-
struments in the recipient countries.
By using cross-sectional data for 2011 (for which the financial inclusion data is available),
we estimate cross-country regression models by controlling key economic, social, and infras-
tructural characteristics. We employ semiparametric partially linear model (PLM) to allow
nonlinearity and heterogeneity in partial effects of remittances on financial inclusion. We
also present baseline results by estimating linear parametric versions of the PLMs in levels
and in first-differences of remittances. The results show that remittances have a significant
negative impact on the use of savings instruments, but have no impact on the demand for
such instruments. These results continue to hold once the data are disaggregated at the
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rural level. Such findings do not hold for the urban sector, however. These findings clearly
suggest that the rural sector has been facing the deficiency of financial infrastructures across
countries, and most of the people who have been migrated from the rural regions are still
unable to access and use financial products and services offered by the formal financial in-
stitutions. Instead, persistent remittances inflows may protect recipient households from
financial risks by ensuring them against future income shocks, such as those generated from
business cycles, political crisis, natural disasters or other domestic vulnerabilities, thereby
causing a decline in savings.
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of remittances on entrepreneurial environment by em-
ploying beta regression model and using panel data including a group of 133 countries over
the period 2004-2012. It has long been argued that small, entrepreneurial firms are an im-
portant source of innovation, jobs and economic growth for both developed and developing
countries. Small businesses, however, face significant legal and regulatory hurdles to be set
up. Several case studies suggest that remittances are an important source of investment
capital for entrepreneurs in the recipient countries, but no studies have been performed to
examine their impact on business regulations and entrepreneurial environment.
We investigate whether remittances enhance the ease of starting a business. The results
provide the evidence that remittances can significantly contribute to entrepreneurial per-
formance in the recipient economy via their favorable impact on financial institutions and
business regulations. Our findings show that inflows of remittances are conductive to doing
business in terms of the ‘ease’ and ‘time’ of starting a business. The results suggest that
international money transfers generate positive incentives for both suppliers and demanders
of financial services.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the major findings and
discussing some policy implications. We also highlight a number of potential avenues for
future research.
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Chapter 2
Remittances and Governance: Does
the Government Free Ride?∗
2.1 Introduction
The massive increase in cross-border movement of nationals has led to a remarkable growth
of global remittances over the last three decades. Remittances now exceed receipts from
export earnings and financial inflows of foreign direct investment for many countries (World
Bank, 2014). As a key resource of foreign capital in the balance of payments, remittances
have outpaced official development assistance and remained more stable than private debt
and portfolio equity flows over past several years (see Kapur and McHale, 2005; International
Monetary Fund, 2010). Though the effects of global trade and international capital flows
on domestic institutions and national policy choices have been studied extensively in the
literature (e.g. Quinn, 1997; Rodrik, 1998; Garrett, 2001; Rudra, 2002; Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian, 2003; Rickard, 2012), no such scrutiny has been witnessed with regard to
international remittance flows.
∗I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Feng Yao, for his guidance throughout this research work. I
am thankful to Prof. Stratford Douglas, Prof. Arabinda Basistha, Prof. Andrew Young, and Prof. Philip
Michelbach for their constructive comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are mine.
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A range of empirical evidence indicates that the economic impacts of remittances vary
across countries and over time (e.g. Glytsos, 1999; Rapoport and Docquier, 2004; Ahmed,
2013). This calls for a nonlinear analysis of the role remittances play across the recipient
economies, with particular emphasis on the incentive effects of remittance inflows (Chami
et al., 2008). We use the cross-country framework developed by La Porta et al. (1999) and
extend the work of Abdih et al. (2012) to study the impact of remittance inflows on the
quality of governance across countries and over time. Though we present our baseline results
by employing parametric techniques, we primarily focus on nonparametric kernel regressions
to analyze the data. These methods allow for uncovering the relevance and linearity of
regressors, heterogeneity in partial effects, and endogenous regressors. We use the two-
stage local polynomial regression estimator developed by Su and Ullah (2008) to handle the
endogeneity of remittances. We follow the innovative procedure adopted by Henderson et
al. (2013) to select instruments in a nonparametric framework.
From the macroeconomic perspectives on studying the effects of remittances, the primary
question arises whether remittances are used to increase consumption (see, e.g., Rempel and
Lodbell, 1978; Adams and Page, 2005; Insights, 2006, Acosta et al., 2009) or to increase in-
vestment (see, e.g., Taylor and Wyatt, 1996; Ratha, 2003; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arrang, 2009;
Aggarwal et al., 2012). These studies have recognized that remittances flows are used either
for household consumption or for investment. The pieces of empirical evidence appear to
be mixed and controversial. However, many researchers and policymakers claim that remit-
tances contribute significantly to consumption expenditure in the home economies. Whether
altruistically motivated or otherwise, an increase in remittances ultimately culminates in a
rise in household income and consequently an increase in consumption (Acosta et al., 2009).
In many developing countries, the bulk of remittances is spent on consumption (Kapur and
McHale 2005). Thus, if remittances are declined, it will directly affect the domestic demand
for manufactured goods (Shaffaeddin, 2009). In the context of non-taxable remittances, the
share of remittances in private consumption is found to increase (Abdih et al., 2012). Remit-
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tances provide domestic residents insurance against future income shocks resulting in higher
private consumption expenditures (see Kapur and Singer, 2006; Orozco, 2004, Chami et al.,
2006).
If the inflow of remittances is sufficiently large, it does not only increase the purchasing
power of recipient households, but also of the families that are not related to emigration (see
Griffin, 1976; Djacjic, 1986). Besides, remittances may induce conspicuous consumption and
discourage labor supply (Acosta et al., 2009; Rapoport and Docquier, 2004). When such
“pecuniary culture” starts to grow; no class of society, even the most abjectly poor, foregoes
all customary conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899). The phenomenon of demonstration
effect may further raise the consumption expenditure of even non-remittance-recipient house-
holds, thereby increasing household consumption in aggregate. Awareness of consumption
habits of others tends to inspire emulation of these practices (Duesenberry, 1949). House-
holds in poor countries imitate consumers in rich countries in consumption behavior due
to international demonstration that pushes up the propensity to consume in poor countries
(Nurkse, 1953). The rapid pace of globalization and migration is a key factor that may
intensify the international consumption externalities.
Our findings show that remittance inflows boost household consumption expenditure in
the recipient economies relative to government consumption expenditure. As a precursor
to our econometric results, looking at the macro level data, we in fact see that a rise in
remittances is positively correlated to the rise in household final consumption expenditure
relative to the government final consumption expenditure across countries and over time,
2010-2012 (see the upper panels, Figure 2.1). At the same time, for a group of countries that
receives a larger size of remittances, this correlation is found to be strong and positive over
time, 2002-2012 (see Figure 2.2). These findings are crucial because a large body of literature
suggests that household and government consumption are substitutes. The key idea is that
the response of economic aggregates to changes in government consumption depends on the
relationship between government and private consumption. Public goods substitute while
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merit goods complement private consumption (Fiorito and Kollintzas, 2004). Other scholars
have found substitutability between private and public consumption for the US and the UK
(Kormendi, 1983; Aschauer, 1985; Bean, 1986; Ahmed, 1986).
Figure 2.1: Remittances (% of GDP, Remitgdp) and the ratio of household consumption
expenditure to government consumption expenditure (Cratio, the upper panels). Consump-
tion expenditures ratio (Cratio) and government control of corruption (Ccorrup, the lower
panels), 2010-2012.
Scatter plots and local polynomial regression (Loess) smoothing. The sample correlation
coefficients are also reported.
The substitutability between private and public goods can have important implications.
Researchers consider remittances as mostly altruistic in nature and take remittance transfers
as gifts, grants or donations. The obvious motivation to remit is simply to care of those
left behind: spouses, children, parents, and members of larger kinship and social circles
(Rapaport and Docquier, 2004; United Nations Development Program, 2011). However, the
government response to such philanthropic supports at national level can shrink the size of
public services. Becker and Lindsay (1994) show a dollar-for-dollar crowding-out of public
funding by private philanthropic donations for higher education. They get evidence for such
government behavior by studying the state-level data for the U. S. economy. They argue
that under certain conditions, even democratic governments have some defined tastes over
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the set of public goods produced by the economy so that substitution is a sensible response
to changing marginal conditions.
Recent cross-country studies show the evidence that inflow of remittances leads to a
decline in the provision of public goods. Remittances reduce the role of insurer of last resort
often played by governments in developing countries (Ebeke, 2011). The inflow of remittances
does not only reduce government consumption, it also sets governments free from the political
conditions; otherwise imposed by organizations such as the International Monetary Fund
while borrowing funds or receiving aids (see Kapur and Singer, 2006). Political incentives in
less democratic regimes tend to substitute resources from the provision of public goods to the
supply of patronage (e.g. corruption) to derive greater utility. For example, governments of
non-oil producing Muslim countries are found to optimally choose to reduce their provision of
welfare goods as households receive more remittances (Ahmed, 2013). Motivated by narrow
interests, the leaders may grant a certain groups the right to appropriate resources from
themselves.
Abdih et al.(2012) argue that remittances are curse and cause a decline in the quality
of domestic institutions. They develop a model of public goods provision in the presence of
non-taxable remittances to show how remittances can lead to increasing share of funds for the
government′s own purposes diverted from public goods provision, even though remittances
do not provide a direct source of revenues for the government. Though they discuss a channel
through which remittances could incentivize governments to free ride on resources, they do
not specify any channel of influence in their econometric model. They argue that the share
of resources for the government′s own purposes diverted from public good provision (i.e.,
corruption) is increasing in remittances relative to the GDP. We take their model up to
derive and show that such diversion of resources is positively associated with the ratio of
household consumption expenditure to government consumption expenditure (we label this
as “consumption expenditures ratio”), which in turn is increasing in the level of remittances
relative to the GDP. If the model developed by Abdih et al.(2012) is consistent with the data,
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the consumption expenditures ratio should be one of the potential channels through which
remittances affect government corruption. The first contribution of this paper is to provide
the evidence for the operation of this channel by specifying consumption expenditures ratio
variable explicitly in the econometric model. If remittances do not influence the consumption
expenditures ratio, we may not expect the government pursuit to be similar.
Figure 2.2: Remittances (% of GDP, Remitgdp) and the ratio of household consumption
expenditure to government consumption expenditure (Cratio) for a set of countries, 2002-
2012.
The broken line represents ‘Cratio’ and the solid line represents ‘Remitgdp’.
As such, the lower panel of the scatter plots in Figure 2.1 indicates that there is a negative
correlation between consumption expenditures ratio and the index of control of corruption
across countries and over time (2010-2012). Also, this correlation is found to be negative and
significant over time, 2002-2012 (see Figure 2.3) for the same group of countries receiving
higher remittances as we had in figure 2.2. As the control of corruption is inversely related
to the level of corruption, the rise in consumption expenditures ratio is positively associated
with the rise in the level of corruption. Indeed, our proposition is not only consistent
with the aforementioned model but is also in accord with several empirical studies in the
literature. As discussed above, researchers show that a rise in remittances is related to a fall in
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Figure 2.3: Consumption expenditures ratio (Cratio) and government corruption (Ccorrup)
for the same set of countries as in Figure 2.2, 2002-2012.
The broken line represents ‘Cratio’ and the solid line represents ‘Ccorrup’.
government consumption expenditure. On the other hand, results from individual country
analysis suggest that inflow of remittances is found to boost consumption expenditure in
the economy. Such findings implicitly imply that the correlation between the inflow of
remittances and the consumption expenditures ratio tends to be positive for the economy as
a whole. In other words, households are using an increasing share of remittances to purchase
private goods by lowering the quantity of public goods in their baskets, and non-remittance-
recipient households are following this pattern as well. The lighter basket of public goods
is likely to reduce households’ incentives to monitor and hold the government accountable.
This may, on the other hand, generate incentives for the government to intervene in the
economy.
Akin to the idea of rent-seeking incentives generated by foreign aids (see Bauer, 1972;
Bovard, 1986; Alesina and Weder, 2002) and by natural resources such as oil and minerals
(see Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003), some scholars consider the inflow of remittances
as a form of economic rent (see Ross 2001; Kapur and McHale, 2005). Kapur and McHale
argue that remittances constitute a form of rents at the national level. They discuss that gov-
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ernments may remain reluctant to devise institutional reforms in favor of growing remittance
inflows. It is because exporting products requires painstaking effort to build the institutions
and infrastructure but exporting people, on the other hand, occurs in most cases by default
rather than by design. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) show that some windfalls such
as revenues from oil and minerals lead to waste, corruption, and deterioration of institutional
quality in countries with higher stock of natural resources. State interventions in the form of
regulatory policies and fiscal imperatives are often used by the governments to create rents.
Unlike foreign aids or revenues from oil and minerals, governments neither receive re-
mittances directly nor do they tax remittances income (see World Bank, 2006; de Luna
Martinez, 2005, Chami et al. 2008). So it is apparent that governments are not benefited
from such private familial transfers. However, when the trend and extent of remittance in-
flows is sufficiently bigger as a share of the country′s GDP, the benefits it generates may go
beyond recipient households. There are several positive externalities in household consump-
tion in terms of higher standard of living, reduced poverty level, higher human capital via
improved health conditions, for instance (see United Nations Development Program, 2011).
We assume that most of these benefits generated by increased household consumption have
public good qualities, and therefore financing of such consumption via remittances may be
subject to government free riding.
Though households must reveal their preference in order to purchase private goods, they
do not have such incentive in the case of public goods. There is a distinction between
households′ demand for public goods and the quantity of public goods they choose in the
presence of remittances. Discovering the optimal level of production of public goods is
problematic as households can be reluctant to reveal their valuations to the government (see
Becker and Lindsay, 1994). On the other hand, if the substitutability of public and private
goods holds as discussed earlier, the government will have no incentive to increase the size
of public goods even though its marginal social benefits would outweigh the marginal social
costs. It is, in fact, the political process that determines the supply of public goods rather
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than the cost-benefit analysis (Hubbard and O′Brien, 2010). The government tendency is
to adjust downward the amount of most public goods as it may consider remittances as a
“windfall” to households. So the output of public goods is not economically efficient in the
presence of remittances. Consequently, the reduced incentives for households to monitor
accountability of the government pose a salient question of ‘inefficiency’ regarding the role
of the government. The politicians, however, focus on redistribution rather than efficiency.
Political theories hold that policies and institutions are shaped by those in power to stay
in power and to transform resources to themselves (La Porta et al., 1999). We therefore
conjecture that remittances induce the government itself to free ride on the provision of
public goods.
Subsequently, the greater latitude of state interventions is likely to increase the expected
benefits for a rational public official from illegitimate transactions with a private partner
relative to the likelihood costs or consequences of being caught up in corruption (see Treis-
man, 2000). Treisman argues that a public official tempts to use the powers of office to
create the super-normal profits or “rents” for his partner by intervening in the market by
designing certain regulatory or taxation measures to give the partner advantages over rivals
in the market. Or the partner may be directly transferred state property under the official′s
control. In return, the private partner pays the official part of the gain.
To quote Fiorito and Kollingtzas (2004), “the response of economic aggregates to changes
in government consumption depends on the relationship between government and private
consumption”. In effect, the higher the consumption expenditures ratio driven by remit-
tances, the higher is the rent-seeking incentives for the government to intervene in the mar-
ket to appropriate resources rather than employing them for the provision of public goods
and services. The anticipated outcomes are inefficient bureaucracy and the increasing use
of public office for personal gains. Our empirical findings strongly support this proposition.
We find that the consumption expenditures ratio is positively correlated with the informal
payments (i.e., rents) paid to the government officials by the country′s firms to get things
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done. The various measures of the quality of governance including the indices of control
of corruption, rule of law, and regulatory quality are found to be declining with the rise in
consumption expenditures ratio driven by the inflow of remittances.
This chapter is organized as follows. We present our empirical approach in section 2.2
where we also derive key equations for the analysis while being consistent with the model
developed by Abdih et al. (2012). A short description of the data and variables is provided
in section 2.3. This will follow by a brief outline of parametric results and then the details
of nonparametric analysis in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical methodology
The local constant kernel estimator for a nonparametric panel specification that treats in-
dividual (country) identifier and time as additional categorical explanatory variables is now
common practice in applied research (e.g., Henderson et al., 2013; Czekaj and Henningsen,
2013). In such specification, time can also be considered as a continuous variable (Li and
Racine, 2007). The bandwidths for the explanatory variables in a mix of continuous and
categorical variables are selected via generalized product kernel functions (see Racine and
Li, 2004).
Let us consider the following nonparametric panel data regression model (see Racine,
2008):
yit = g(xit) + uit; i = 1, 2, · · · , N ; t = 1, 2, · · · , T ; (2.1)
Where yit is the observed regressand, g(.) is the unknown but smooth regression function,
xit = (xit,1, . . . , xit,q) is a vector of regressors of dimension q, E(uit/xit,1, . . . , xit,q) = 0, i
represents individual unit, and t represents time.
The unknown function g(.) in equation (2.1) can be estimated using the local constant
kernel estimator as mentioned above. This estimation strategy is preferable to traditional
parametric panel methods in several respects. The traditional approach allows heterogenity
20
across countries and time by employing numerous country and year dummies in the spec-
ification resulting in the considerable loss of degrees of freedom. By including individual
country identifier as a categorical variable and time as either a categorical or a continuous
variable, the kernel approach does not only allow to control country fixed-effects and time-
specific effects but also allow them to interact among the regressors. The kernel estimator
does not suffer from the loss of observations because there is no data transformation or
first-differencing. The inclusion of time as a continuous variable in the nonparametric speci-
fication is similar to one of the traditional approach that allows time variation by specifying
a linear or quadratic time trend in the model.
The defining characteristic of this nonparametric approach is that the individual and
time effects are non-additive and non-separable. This means that the level of the depen-
dent variable ‘intercept’ and also the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the
dependent variable ‘slopes’ may differ between time periods and between individuals and the
time effects may depend on the individual, while the individual effects may vary over time.
Hence, the kernel method does not imply any restrictions on the models. Furthermore, the
bandwidths of the explanatory variables can be selected using data-driven cross-validation
methods. Thus, the overall shape of the relationship between the dependent variable and
the regressors, the individual, and time is entirely determined by the data (Czekaj and
Henningsen, 2013).
In this paper, we use the nonparametric specification (2.1) with time as a continuous
variable and estimate it using the local constant estimator. However, we exclude the coun-
try identifier. This model choice is crucial for our analysis due to two reasons. First, the
specification (2.1) allows parameter heterogeneity across country and time as mentioned in
the previous paragraph. The structure of relationship between variables are determined
nonparametrically by kernel methods that allow interaction among variables. Second, most
of the explanatory variables in our model are time-invariant exogenous variables. Inclusion
of exogenous explanatory variables in the model even make a pooled model appropriate for
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the analysis because they are not correlated to the country-specific component of the model
error (see Ashley, 2012). As the included time-invariant exogenous variables take account
of several country-specific characteristics, the omitted variable bias due to unobserved fac-
tors/attributes of the country is assumed to be negligible. So, it is less important to model
other portion of variation in the expected value of yit across countries which is not explained
by the across-country variations in the explanatory variables. For example, if ethnic frac-
tionalization of a country affects government corruption in 2002, it will also affect corruption
in 2012. But once the ethnic fractionalization is taken into account, no further manipulation
regarding its effect (or such fixed effects) is required in the model.
We employ several country-level fixed attributes in the specification such as legal origins,
religious affiliation of the population, ethnic fractionalization, and geographical features in-
cluding the country′s latitude and topography. These variables are considered as exogenous
to the quality of governance (La Porta et al., 1999). Had we chosen the fixed-effects model
instead, the expected impacts of these time-invariant explanatory variables on the left-hand
side variable were likely to be wiped-out. Thus, we argue that once the country-level hetero-
geneity is taken into account in terms of the included regressors (that are unique to individual
country and capture individual heterogeneity), controlling for additional fixed-effects causes
redundancy in our model. For comparison with the nonparametric analysis, however, we use
OLS estimation of parametric panel versions of nonparametric model (2.1).
We employ the theoretical cross-country framework developed by La Porta et al.(1999)and
extend it to panel studies as suggested by Ahdih et al.(2012) but will apply the nonpara-
metric regression tools to identify the relevance and linearity of explanatory variables to
emphasize the role of the data for selecting the appropriate models. Under our modeling
procedure, the unknown function g(.) in model (2.1) can be interpreted as the conditional
mean of the response variable y given the vector of regressors x. One of the commonly em-
ployed nonparametric estimators is the local-constant (Nadaraya-Watson) kernel estimator
of the conditional mean function g(.) which can be written as
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Where,
q∏
s=1
K
(
xsi − xs
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)
is the product kernel and hs is the smoothing parameter (band-
width) for a particular regressor xs (see Henderson et al., 2013). Similar to the minimization
of sum of squared residuals in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the estimator (2.2) is the
solution of the minimization (of the integrated mean squared error (IMSE) of the estimator)
problem that uses a ‘constant’to approximate the conditional mean function g(.) (or y) in
the neighborhood of regressors x (see Li and Racine, 2007). In other words, the estimator
(2.2) is the locally weighted average of y by considering those values of y which are within
a small area in terms of the values taken by the explanatory variables, x. We can think this
estimator as the smooth moving average of y. One could instead use a local linear kernel
estimator to estimate g(.) to address the bias arising from asymmetry of kernel weights at
the boundaries of the domain of regressors. However, given the specific regression function
of slowly evolving institutional characteristics, we ignore this boundary issue and use the
local constant estimator (2.2).
An important feature of the kernel regression is that it allows us to identify whether
an explanatory variable is relevant to a model. It also indicates whether the relevant vari-
able enters the model linearly. For exploratory purpose, we employ the fully data-driven
cross-validation methods of bandwidths selection with time as a categorical variable. After
selecting the explanatory variables to be included in the model, we use the ‘rule-of-thumb’
method for bandwidths selection for the regressors in estimation. This method of bandwidths
selection is also employed by Su and Ullah (2008) to conduct their estimator’s asymptotic
properties. As our regression function is supposed to be flat that represents slowly evolving
institutional characteristics conditional on several country-level fixed attributes, we assume
all regressors enter to the regression function symmetrically. This is the major reason behind
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our choice of the rule-of-thumb method (see Li and Racine, 2007). We use the second order
Gaussian kernel for continuous variables and Li and Racine kernel for ordered and unordered
categorical variables in all estimation purposes.
Our choice of the kernel regression method is primarily based on its benefits of studying
the heterogeneity in partial effects and handling of the endogenous regressors. A detail
explanation of this approach in an empirical setting can be found in Henderson et al.(2013).
As remittances may be potentially endogenous with the quality of governance, we use the
two-stage local polynomial regression estimator developed by Su and Ullah (2008) to handle
the endogeneity of remittances. We adopt the innovative procedure to select instruments in
a nonparametric framework proposed by Henderson et al.(2013).
In the remaining of this section, we present our key propositions mathematically and
consistently within the model developed by Abdih et al.(2012). Their key argument is
that the resources diverted by the government for its own purposes is increasing in the
level of remittances relative to GDP. We show below that the resource diversion is positively
associated with the ratio of household consumption to government consumption expenditures
and the ratio itself is increasing in the level of remittances relative to GDP.
Starting from equation (10) in Abdih et al., (see Abdih et al., 2012)
s¯∗
g¯∗
=
βy + βR
(t− β)y − βR (2.3)
Where s¯
∗
g¯∗ is the rate of resource diversion by the government (optimal level of resources
diverted by the government as a ratio of total government spending), β represents a measure
of incentives for the government to divert resources to its own consumption such that β >
0, R stands for the size of remittance inflows, and y is the measure of the GDP. Now,
substituting R in (2.3) from the budget constraint equation in Abdhi et al.,
s¯∗
g¯∗
=
βy + βR
(t− β)y − βR =
βy + β(c+ g∗ − y + ty)
(t− β)y − βR (2.4)
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Where c is household consumption of private goods and g∗ is the households′ optimal
demand for public goods. By simplification,
s¯∗
g¯∗
=
β(c+ g∗ + ty)
g¯∗
=
β(c+ g∗) + βty
g¯∗
=
βty
g¯∗
+
β(c+ g∗)
g¯∗
(2.5)
In equation(2.5), the quantity (c+g
∗)
g¯∗ or equivalently
c+g∗
y
g¯∗
y
represents the ratio of optimal
household consumption expenditure (% of GDP) to the optimal government provision of
public goods (% of GDP) in an economy where remittances are non-taxable (see Ahdih et
al., 2012). By approximating the government provision of public goods by the government
consumption expenditure (% of GDP), we get from (2.5):
s¯∗
g¯∗
=
βt
g¯∗/y
+ β ∗ Consumption expenditures ratio (Cratio); β > 0 (2.6)
The “consumption expenditures ratio” stands for the ratio of household consumption
expenditure (% of GDP) to government consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Expressing
for the consumption expenditures ratio, using (2.3) and (2.6),
Cratio =
1
β
[
s∗
g¯∗
− βty
g¯∗
]
=
1
β
[
βy + βR
(t− β)y − βR) −
βty
(t− β)y − βR
]
=
1
β
[
βy + βR− βty
(t− β)y − βR
]
=
1
β
[
β(y +R− ty)
(t− β)y − βR
]
=
[
(y +R− ty)
(t− β)y − βR
]
Multiplying and dividing the last expression by y,
Cratio =
[
(1− t+ (R/y)
(t− β)− β(R/y)
]
Differentiating with respect to R/y ,
∂(Cratio)
∂(R/y)
=
∂
∂(R/y)
[
1− t+ (R/y)
(t− β)− β(R/y)
]
(2.7)
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Applying the quotient rule in (2.7),
=
∂[1−t+(R/y)]
∂(R/y)
[(t− β)− β(R/y)]− ∂[(t−β)−β(R/y)]
∂(R/y)
[1− t+ (R/y)]
[(t− β)− β(R/y)]2
By simplification,
∂(Cratio)
∂(R/y)
=
t(1− β)
[(t− β)− β(R/y)]2 > 0 (2.8)
Now let us consider equations (2.6) and (2.8) together. Abdih et al. (2012) argue that
resource diversion by the government is increasing in the level of remittances relative to
GDP. We have shown that the resource diversion is positively associated with the ratio of
household consumption expenditure to government consumption expenditure (i.e., consump-
tion expenditures ratio) at their optimal levels (% of GDP) as shown by equation (2.6), and
the consumption expenditures ratio itself is increasing in the level of remittances relative to
GDP as shown by equation (2.8). The main contribution of this paper is to test these propo-
sitions empirically in the following sections by including both variables, i.e., remittances
and consumption expenditures ratio in the model specification. As these two variables are
potentially correlated, if the consumption expenditures ratio is excluded from the model (as
in Abdih et al., 2012), the coefficient estimates will suffer from the omitted variable bias or
endogeneity. We argue that it is the consumption expenditures ratio channel through which
the inflow of remittances drives the government to be a free rider. We show our results to
be very robust and stable across estimation techniques.
2.3 Data and variables
Our data comes from three major sources: the World Bank databases (Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) and World Development Indicators (WDI)), the Heritage Foun-
dation, and the Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID). Our
primary measure of the quality of governance is the “control of corruption index” (Ccorrup)
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from WGI database. Other measures of governance quality include rule of Law (rulelaw),
regulatory quality(regqua) (from WGI), and freedom from corruption index (frcorrup) from
the Heritage Foundation database. These indicators from WGI are based on 32 individual
data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental or-
ganizations, international organizations, and private sector firms (WGI, the World Bank).
We also use the informal payments to public officials (% of firms) as one of our measures
of government performance. This approximates the government′s rent-seeking behavior, de-
fined as the percentage of firms expected to make informal payments to public officials to
“get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, and the like.
We proxy the household consumption by household final consumption expenditure (%
of GDP) and the government consumption by the general government final consumption
expenditure (% of GDP). The main variable of interest in our analysis is the ratio household
final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) to the general government final consumption
expenditure (% of GDP), and we label this as “consumption expenditures ratio” (Cratio). We
include both consumption expenditures ratio and remittances (% of GDP) in the econometric
model. Remittances(Remitgdp) is defined as the sum of worker′s remittances, compensation
of employees, and migrant′s transfers in the balance of payments. These variables come
from WDI. Other explanatory variables from WDI include GDP per capita (constant 2005
US$, Lgdppc); trade (sum of exports and imports (% of GDP), Open); energy depletion (%
of GNI, Energy) defined as the ratio of the value of the stock of energy resources to the
remaining reserve lifetime that covers coal, crude oil, and natural gas.
The remaining control variables proxy for the country level fixed characteristics such as
legal origin variables (defined in terms of binary variables for British common law, Social-
ist/communist laws, and French, Germany, and Scandinavian commercial codes); religious
affiliation of the population (defined as the percentage of the population of each country
that belonged to Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, and other religious denominations (as per
1980 data)); and geographical variables including country′s latitude (absolute value of the
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latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1), and coastal area (defined as
% of total land of a country within 100 km of coast, Lnd100km). These control variables are
collected from the Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID). Also,
the control for ethnic fractionalization (Ethnic, expressed as an index variable that measures
“ethnicity” as a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics, see Alesina et al., 2003)
comes from the official website of University of California Anderson School of Management.
A summary statistics of all the variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 10 (see
Appendix).
The period of analysis covers 2002 - 2012. Our cross-country time-series dataset forms an
unbalanced panel consisting of 106 countries based on the availability of data that excludes
the Group of Seven (G7) countries, Western European OECD countries, and Australia. The
reason is that these countries are structurally different from the rest of the world regarding
governance quality and their responses to remittances. The total number of country-year
observations in the dataset is 1025. The dataset is available from the author upon request.
2.4 Empirical findings
2.4.1 Parametric estimates
Table 2.1-2.4 present our parametric panel estimates for the model of the quality of gov-
ernance. The index of control of corruption is the main dependent variable. However, we
analyze the regression models with other measures of governance throughout the analysis.
Following La Porta et al. (1999), we employ the cross-country framework with historical,
political and social determinants of government performance as our control variables in the
specification. We include our variables of interest: remittances and the consumption expen-
ditures ratio in most of our model specifications.
We summarize our findings from the linear parametric models in Tables 1−4 (see Ap-
pendix). Table 2.1 presents the estimates for several versions of panel models. We pooled
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the data and include time trend in the first column. As most of our explanatory variables are
time-invariant, the fixed-effects model is not an appropriate option for our analysis. In other
words, it does not allow to study the impacts of time-invariant regressors on the dependent
variable because the process of data transformation removes these variables from the models.
As a complement to the fixed-effects model, we estimate between-effects panel models for
some specifications. Between effects models are similar to the cross sectional analysis but
the difference is that it averages the values for each regressor over the entire time periods
and run the OLS to these averaged values. So we need to discard time variation in between-
effects estimation. When we include both remittances and consumption expenditures ratio
in the model, the coefficient on consumption expenditures ratio is negative and statistically
significant. However, the coefficient on remittances is negative but not significant. This
finding is consistent when we run random effects models in columns 4 and 5 with no time
effects. However, when we include time-effects, the coefficient on remittances turn to be
insignificant in column 6. As random effects models allow the country specific-effects to be
random, it also allows cross country variations to make influence on the dependent variables.
In other words, the heterogeneity across countries may be the cause of the variation in the
left-hand side variable and the random effects model takes this variation into account. As
most of the regressors including historical, political and religious explantory variables are
exogenous (see La Porta et al., 1999), these variables are not supposed to be correlated
with the country-specific effects and the use of random effects model appears suitable in our
analysis.
On the other hand, if the explanatory variables are correlated with the country-specific
effects, random effects model will not provide consistent estimates. To take this into account,
and to address the endogeneity of remittances on the regression of government corruption,
we employ the Hausman-Taylor estimation. Under certain conditions, this provides the
consistent estimation of even the time-invariant explanatory variables. The seventh and
eighth columns of Table 2.1 presents the estimates from the Hausman-Taylor strategy. The
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results from this estimation show that the coefficient with the consumption expenditures ratio
is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, but the coefficient on the remittances is
not significant, though it retains negative sign.
The adverse impacts of the consumption expenditures ratio on government performance
is further supported by the estimation results with other measures of governance as reported
in Table 2.2. We use the rule of law, regulatory quality, and the informal payments to
government officials (% of firms) for rent-seeking purposes as our other measures of the
quality of governance. Whereas the consumption ratio negatively affects first of these two
measures, the coefficient with the third measure comes with positive sing and statistically
significant magnitude (see the seventh column in Table 2.2). This implies that the rise in the
consumption expenditures ratio as a result of remittance inflows increases the arbitrariness
in the public administration and the bureaucracy. Our findings from the linear parametric
models show that the rise in remittances and the resulting increase in the consumption
expenditures ratio lead to the deterioration of the country′s economic, social, and political
institutions. We also assess the robustness of above findings by regressing corruption on
3-year average of explanatory variables in Table 2.3. We find that our previous results still
hold, and with impressively significant coefficient estimates.
Before completing the outline of our results from this section, it is important to note that
the correlation between the inflow of remittances and the consumption expenditures ratio is
positive and statistically significant (see Table 2.4). The coefficient estimates on remittances
is positive and statistically significant in the model with household final consumption ex-
penditure, the case is not similar with the model where government final consumption is the
dependent variable. These findings provide us strong supports for our hypothesis that the
inflow of remittances rises household consumption relative to the government consumption
in the recipient economies. While we mentioned our findings with grater emphasis on just
two variables in this section, we see that the estimates with most of our control variables are
consistent with the general findings in the literature. We will investigate these issues further
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below with the nonparametric econometric analyses.
2.4.2 Nonparametric estimates
We explore several benefits of nonparametric techniques to study the impacts of remittances
on the quality of governance, and on corruption in particular. Using the fully data-driven
cross-validation method of bandwidths selection, we examine whether an explanatory vari-
able is relevant in the specification; and whether it enters the model linearly. We focus on
the relationship between remittances and consumption expenditures ratio and their impacts
on the dependent variable. We also present the estimates for each included regressor from
our nonparametric models. These estimates shed light on the underlying partial effects of
the particular regressor on the dependent variable across countries and over time. We ad-
dress the bias and inconsistency problems arising from the endogeneity of remittances by
employing instrumental variables strategy within the nonparametric framework.
Irrelevant regressors
The traditional approach in regression analysis is to specify a linear model with a known
functional form and to use ordinary least squares to estimate the unknown parameters.
Usually, a researcher uses his/her knowledge of economic theory whether or not to include a
particular variable in the model specification. As the true regression functional form is rarely
known in practice, the parameter estimates are likely to be inconsistent. The nonparametric
kernel regression is an alternative for such deficiencies in the traditional methods.
Using cross-validation methods for bandwidths, we can detect whether a variable is rel-
evant in the regression model. If so, it is considered to be a useful predictor of the left-hand
side variable. Hall et al. (2007) show that with local constant estimator with least square
cross-validation method, when the bandwidths on any regressor reaches its upper bound, the
regressor is essentially ‘smoothed out’in the sense that it does not play a role to explain any
of the variation in the conditional mean of the dependent variable. As the upper bound turns
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to be at infinity, when the bandwidth exceeds a few standard deviations of the regressor,
the variable is considered irrelevant in practice (Henderson et al., 2013). For our analysis,
we consider the upper bound for a continuous variable as two times the standard deviation
of the variable. For a categorical variable, the lower and upper bounds with Li and Racine
kernel are 0 and 1.
We include all the explanatory variables in the regression specification as in the paramet-
ric models with religion variables. However, if we use legal variables in this exploration, the
resulting bandwidths are equivalent. Table 2.5 presents the bandwidths from least squares
cross-validation methods. The columns denoted by ‘UB’represent the upper bound for the
bandwidths for each regressor. The first three columns deal with control of corruption as
the dependent variable. In this regression, the bandwidths from local constant (LC) estima-
tor for both consumption expenditures ratio and remittances are smaller than their upper
bounds. This suggests that both of them are relevant predictors of corruption. This sup-
ports our hypothesis that consumption expenditures ratio appears to be a potential channel
of influence for government corruption.
The bandwidths selected via local constant estimator for GDP per capita, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, and Muslim religion are also less than their upper bounds. So they are
relevant in the prediction of government corruption as suggested by economic theories. The
bandwidth for economic openness variable is far greater than its upper bound implying that
it is not a potential regressor in the corruption equation. This provides a support for La
Porta et al. (1999) who did not specify economic openness variable in their framework.
However, this idea is against many empirical studies that consider economic openness as a
key factor to influence government behavior (e.g., Garrett, 2001; Ricard, 2012). However, the
bandwidths for a country′s latitude and Catholic religion indicate that they are not relevant
in the model. In fact, our data set excludes many developed countries with higher scales
of latitude. The implication is that a link between latitude and government performance is
weakened in the sample. This may be the reason why Abdih et al. (2012) excluded latitude
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variable from the list of explanatory variables. A country′s stock of natural resources, on
the other hand, is not showing relevance in government corruption as the local constant
bandwidth for energy variable is very large in comparison to its upper bound. This signals
against the notion of natural resource course literature that larger stock of natural resources
deteriorates governance and hinders growth (see Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). A
few number of oil-rich countries in our data sample may explain why this finding may arise
due to sample selection bias.
The fifth column represents bandwidths for regressors for the model in which rule of law
is the dependent variable. The bandwidth for consumption expenditures ratio is smaller than
its upper bound, thereby making it a relevant predictor of a country′s quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts. However, the local constant band-
width for remittances is far greater than its upper bound. This non-relevance of remittances
in the rule of law regression implies that remittance variable is not a factor responsible for
any variation in the country′s rule of law indicator. This is a strong support for our propo-
sition that remittances itself does not affect government performance. It is the consumption
expenditures ratio that possibly connects the influence of remittances inflows to the quality
of governance across countries. In rule and law regression, Catholic religion appears to be
a relevant variable. The bandwidths for the remaining variables are consistent with the
bandwidths in second column.
Unlike bandwidths from local constant estimator for corruption and rule of law regres-
sions, the bandwidth for consumption expenditures ratio is larger than its upper bound in
regulatory quality equation. However, the size is not sufficiently bigger in comparison to the
case of remittances in the rule of law equation. If we considered three times the standard
deviation of a regressor for the upper bounds instead of two times, consumption expendi-
tures ratio would appear as a relevant variable. As there are no such firm rules in these
exploratory works, we will employ formal regression analyses to examine our propositions in
the following sections.
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Remittances and Cratio: Bandwidth results
We claim that an increase in the inflow of remittances leads to a rise in the consumption
expenditures ratio (Cratio). The bandwidths selected via local constant least squares cross-
validation method says that if the bandwidth for a regressor is smaller than its upper bound,
the regressor is relevant; in the sense that it is a potential candidate for explaining the varia-
tion in the left-hand side variable. So it is important to look at the bandwidth for remittance
variable in the regression of consumption expenditures ratio. The bandwidths for this re-
gression are shown in the final two columns of Table 2.5. Under the same set of regressors,
we see that the local constant estimator produces the bandwidth for the remittances which
is much smaller than its upper bound. What this says is that remittances is a key factor to
predict the variation in consumption expenditures ratio and so there is a potential correlation
between these two variables. We must therefore specify not only remittances in a model for
the quality of governance, but we also need to include the consumption expenditures ratio to
avoid misspecification of our econometric model, and to reduce the problems due to omitted
variable bias. We will proceed in the direction of these bandwidth results.
Identifying linearity
The bandwidths for each regressor estimated via local linear kernel estimator using least
squares cross-validation methods are presented in the third, sixth, and the ninth column of
Table 2.5. These bandwidths show a fairly common picture of how each of our regressors
enters the regression model. As the bandwidths for all regressors are relatively smaller than
their upper bounds, their relationship with the dependent variable is a nonlinear process.
We therefore can not assume a linear model for our empirical analysis. We conduct the Hasio
et al. (2007) test for the regression models represented by Table 2.5 to examine whether
a linear parametric model is a possibility, but reject the null of correct linear speicification
at 1% level of significance. Thus, a linear model can not capture the true data generating
process. The better performance of the nonparametric models lies on the fact that they allow
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for interactions among the explanatory variables. Uncovering the underlying heterogeneity
in partial effects is the defining characteristic of the nonparametric kernel regression.
Partial effects
The study of bandwidths provided us indication whether our explanatory variables are rele-
vant to the model. One or more of the regressors were not relevant in one regression model
but they appeared relevant in another regression model(s) of the quality of governance. So,
based on the modeling framework of La Porta et al. (1999) and inputs from the related
literature, we include all the regressors in the nonparametric estimation as in the parametric
models presented earlier. This also facilitates the comparison of the nonparametric estimates
with their parametric counterparts.
Table 2.6 presents the local constant quartile coefficient estimates from our nonparametric
models of the quality of governance. The estimates correspond to the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentiles (denoted by Q1, Q2, and Q3) of the estimated parameter distribution. These
partial effect estimates for each variable are obtained by holding all other regressors at their
median values. The first three columns show quartile estimates for the regression model
where control of corruption is the dependent variable. These nonparametric results reveal
some crucial features of our data. First, the estimates vary substantially from one quartile
value to another quartile value for all regressors. This can be observed from the graphical
plots of the estimated coefficients for some of the regressors in Figure 2.4. The implication of
this finding goes against the homogeneity assumption or parameter stability in parametric
linear models. The estimated kernel estimates simply indicate that heterogeneity among
countries is a challenging issue and can not be avoided in studying the partial effects of
a particular explanatory variable on the dependent variable. A careful reader will notice
that the fit in nonparametric estimation is almost twice of that of parametric models. This
further justifies the results from the Hasio et al. (2007) model specification test we conducted
earlier.
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Figure 2.4: Kernel density plots of estimates using local constant estimator for the regression
model of corruption. Note: ‘Cratio’ stands for the consumption expenditures ratio while
some plots are excluded.
Second, the qualitative results from the nonparametric estimation do not change from
their parametric counterparts presented in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. In most cases, the
estimates do not only have the same sign, but they also have equal magnitudes. The partial
effect of the logarithm of real GDP is positive and significant at all quartiles. The partial
effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and Muslim religion on government performance
are negative and significant as found in the development economics literature (see La Porta
et al. 1999, Alesina et al., 2003). Catholic denomination has similar negative impacts;
but the partial effects of latitude are positive and significant on corruption. Again, this
unexpected result may indicate the sample selection bias in our data set as we excluded most
of the developed world from our data sample. The estimates with stock of natural resources
come with negative sign but is not significant as was the case in parametric results. As we
discussed, this biased outcome may arise due to the inclusion of only a few number of oil-rich
countries in our sample. On the other hand, the economic openness appear to have a positive
and significant impact on corruption. Though open economies are often found to abide by
international norms and principles of good governance, excessively liberalized economies in
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the early stages of economic development may suffer from bureaucratic malfunctions.
Third, our main explanatory variables: consumption expenditures ratio and remittances
come with negative coefficient estimates. For the consumption expenditures ratio, the par-
tial effects are negative and strongly significant (see also Figure 2.4). Though the estimates
for remittances are negative, they are insignificant. These results do not only confirm our
findings from earlier analyses, but they also imply a potential mechanism about how the
impacts of remittances occur on government performance. Remittances clearly show a neg-
ative association with government corruption, but the channel of influence is not as direct
as in the econometric model of Abdih et al. (2012). The adverse impacts run through the
substitutability relationship between household and government consumption expenditures.
It is only when households use remittances to buy increasingly larger amount of private
goods relative to public goods and services in their consumption, the government enters into
the system via reduction of public goods provision. Government does so because there are
several positive externalities in households′ consumption due to increase in their disposable
(remittance) income. The motive of government is to substitute public goods for remittances
and to appropriate economic resources for its own political objectives as we discussed ear-
lier. The macroeconomic consequences of the government intervention in the economy are
the fragile bureaucracy, inefficient output of public goods and services, and deteriorating
economic and political institutions.
In Table 2.6, we also perform robustness checks for our results from the control of cor-
ruption regression with other measures of the quality of governance. The other columns
in Table 2.6 present the estimates when rule of law and regulatory quality are dependent
variables respectively. The partial effect estimates from these models show it clearly that
our claims in the preceding paragraph are not without justifications. The results provide
strong supports for the government free riding over the provision of public goods and ser-
vices. The partial effects of consumption expenditures ratio on both indicators of the quality
of governance, viz., rule of law and regulatory quality are negative and statistically signif-
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icant. Again, though remittances affect these variables negatively, the coefficient estimates
are not statistically significant as in the previous results. The partial estimates for all other
regressors on these two indicators of governance are consistent with those from the regression
model of corruption.
Level effects
It is crucial to examine how the partial impacts of remittances and consumption expenditures
ratio vary across their levels. Our findings show that a rise in remittances causes a rise in
consumption expenditures ratio. As the increase in consumption expenditures ratio adversely
affects the quality of governance, we would like to explore how this impact changes with the
rise in the levels of these variables across countries.
To carry out this analysis, we split the estimated partial estimates for consumption expen-
ditures ratio and remittances into four disjoint groups by the data samples of these variables.
The partial effect estimates are divided by the quartiles of remittances and consumption ex-
penditures ratio. We then report the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the distribution
of each group of estimates to see the level impacts of these variables on government perfor-
mance. We present the results of this aspect of analysis in Table 2.7. In the first regression
with control of corruption as a dependent variable, the median partial effects of consumption
expenditures ratio rises when the level of consumption ratio increases from its lower quartile
until it reaches to its third quartile value. The partial effects then decline. This finding
is consistent with other measures of the government performance presented in Table 2.7.
The implication is that when the rise in remittances leads to higher private consumption,
the government characterizes the increase in housholds′ (remittance) income as a windfall.
Over the course of time, the government intensifies the downward adjustment of the size of
provision of public goods and services to substitute them for remittances.
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Remittances and Cratio: Nonparametric estimates
In previous section, we presented our baseline results showing the relationship between re-
mittances, household final consumption expenditure, and government final consumption ex-
penditure using linear models. We found that remittances significantly explain the variation
in both household final consumption expenditure and consumption expenditure ratio (Cra-
tio). The coefficient estimates with remittances in both of these cases were found to be
positive and highly significant. However, the relationship between remittances and govern-
ment final consumption expenditure was not explicit. To examine these relationship further,
we estimate the same set of models as in Table 2.4 but now employing kernel methods. The
nonparametric estimates from this analysis are presented in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9. The
quartile estimates with remittances in the model of household consumption are all positive
with a large variation in the size of coefficients (see columns 2-4, Table 2.8). Importantly,
the estimates at the range of upper quartile (Q3) and beyond are found to be statistically
significant. The percentile estimates at this specific range of coefficient distribution are re-
ported with corresponding bootstrap standard errors in the upper panel of Table 2.9. On
the other hand, the quartile estimates with remittances are all negative in the model of gov-
ernment consumption which are presented in columns 5-7 in Table 2.8. In this model, most
of the estimates at the range of lower quartile (Q1) and below are statistically significant.
The percentile estimates at this range are presented with corresponding bootstrap standard
errors in the central panel of Table 7a. Furthermore, in the model of consumption expendi-
tures ratio, the quartile estimates with remittances are all positive (see columns 8-10, Table
2.8), whereas the estimates with the upper quartile and beyond are found to be statistically
significant (see lower panel, Table 2.9.). These nonparametric coefficient estimates are de-
picted along with bootstrap standard errors in Table 2.10, once we split the estimates by the
quartiles data values on remittances. The estimates at the lower quartile, Q1, are significant
irrespective of the group. Note that estimates in all groups and ranges are negative.
Instead of considering the single global parameter estimate from the strictly restricted
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linear parametric model as in Table 2.4, if we look at the heterogeneity in the partial effects
of remittances on government consumption expenditure in Tables 2.8 - 2.10, most of the
nonparametric estimates bear negative sign with varying partial impacts. So we conclude
this section with the claim that a rise in remittances is associated with a decline in the
size of government consumption expenditures across countries, thereby revealing a case of
governmental free-riding on the provision of public goods and services in the presence of
remittances.
Instrumental variables estimation
In this subsection, we consider the regression model with government corruption as the de-
pendent variable. We allow remittances to be endogenous. To isolate the potential causality
from remittances to corruption, we introduce an instrumental variable, namely, the coastal
area defined as the % of total land of a country within 100km of coast. This variable have
been commonly employed in empirical works in development economics literature. We exam-
ine the relevance and validity of our instrument via local constant cross-validation method
of bandwidth selection. Table 2.11 presents the resulting bandwidths for the included re-
gressors.
We follow Henderson et al.(2013) approach for selecting instruments in a nonparametric
framework. From the second column in Table 2.11, we see that the coastal area variable
is smoothed out of the regression because its bandwidth from local constant is far greater
than its upper bound, and so it is not a relevant predictor of the left-hand-side variable,
i.e., government corruption. However, this variable is found to be relevant in the regression
of remittances as shown in the fourth column of Table 2.11 because the bandwidth for the
coastal variable is much less than the upper bound. We argue in the corruption equation
that the coastal variable does not influence government corruption but is highly correlated
with remittances which we believe is potentially endogenous. This variable has been used as
an instrument for remittances in some cross-sectional studies (see Abdih et al., 2012). From
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our analysis, we consider the coastal area of a country to be a relevant and valid instrument
for remittances. As we have a single endogenous regressor and one instrument, our new
model is just identified.
We apply Su and Ullah (2008) two-stage local polynomial estimator for estimating our
new model. The Su and Ullah estimator provides a consistent estimation of nonparametric
simultaneous equations models under certain conditions. There are three consecutive stages
for applying Su and Ullah (2008) estimator to data. In the first stage, we regress the
endogenous variable, that is, remittances on its instrument (coastal area) and all other
exogenous explanatory variables. The GDP per capita could be endogenous with governance,
so we have replaced it by initial GDP per capita (logarithm of GDP per capita for 2002). We
employ the local constant estimator and use the rule-of-thumb method for bandwidths for
the regressors. We extract the residual from the estimated model to be used in the second
stage. In the second stage, as we have only continuous variables in the model, we again
employ the local constant estimator to regress our response variable, control of corruption,
on this residual, the endogenous variable, and other relevant explanatory variables. Finally,
we employ the marginal integration technique to derive the marginal effects of our variables
of interest on government corruption. The local constant nonparametric estimates for the
consumption expenditures ratio from the third stage are presented in Table 2.12.
The results from the instrumental variables estimation are very close to the estimated
partial effects obtained from the nonparametric estimation of the model as presented in Table
2.6. The estimates as presented in Table 2.12, retain the sign as in nonparametric partial
effects and the magnitudes are also equivalent. This result provides a very convincing support
for our hypothesis that the inflow of remittances adversely affects the quality of governance
through the consumption expenditures ratio channel. The findings from our nonparametric
instrumental variables estimation are very consistent to all of our previous results.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
In this essay, we have investigated the potential causality between inflow of remittances and
the quality of governance across countries and over time. Our findings show that remittances
do not directly affect government performance. This is because remittances represent private
familial transfers and are not directly taxed. However, when the extent and growth of remit-
tance inflows is sufficiently large in the share of the country′s GDP, it can potentially affect
the incentives faced by households and the government in remittance-receiving economies.
Our results indicate that rise in remittances are associated with an increasing demand for
private goods but a decreasing share of public goods in household consumption. Concerning
government motivation, we find a significant negative association between remittances and
government consumption expenditure. This implies that remittances induce the government
to substitute the provision of public goods for remittances. Our empirical study, therefore,
provide evidence of governmental free-riding on public goods provision in the presence of
remittances. The econometric analysis suggests that substitution of resources occurs in a
nonlinear fashion across countries; and leads to higher government corruption, deterioration
of rule and law, and inferior regulatory quality; thereby causing a loss in public welfare.
The findings imply that public-private partnership can be an important mechanism to
avoid potential misallocation of public resources in the presence of remittances. Such col-
laborative efforts can significantly contribute to productive investment, both in private and
public sectors. Recently, international organizations, financial agencies, and many govern-
ments have increased their focus on how to channelize flows of remittances through formal
financial institutions. The lessons from this analysis are expected to contribute to these
global efforts to redirect remittances inflows from current uses toward empowering house-
holds and increasing their access to financial products and services. The use of remittances
to this end can avoid the consequences of governmental free-riding on the provision of public
goods and services, thereby materializing potential benefits from remittances by leveraging
them for economic growth and development.
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2.7 Appendix
Table 2.1: OLS and panel estimates for parametric specifications.
Dependent variable: control of corruption
Variable Pooled Between Between Random Random Random Haus-Taylor Haus-Taylor
Cratio -0.035∗∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.00057) (0.01928) (0.00509) (0.00507) (0.00512) (0.00506)
Remitgdp -0.007∗∗∗ -0.0119 -0.014∗ -0.0025 -0.003∗ -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0015
(0.00210) (0.00757) (0.00758) (0.00169) (0.00169) (0.00169) (0.00173) (0.00172)
Lgdppc 0.622∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗
(0.03728) (0.11792) (0.11033) (0.06603) (0.06454) (0.07959) (0.07442) (0.08922)
Energy -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.00148) (0.00448) (0.00447) (0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00180) (0.00175) (0.00183)
Open -0.0003 0.00073 0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0003 0.00006 0.0002
(0.00045) (0.00159) (0.00160) (0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00048) (0.00047) (0.00049)
Ethnic -0.402∗∗∗ -0.37434 -0.3101 -0.410∗ -0.3903 -0.3094 -0.746∗∗ -0.4094
(0.07640) (0.24185) (0.24148) (0.2361) (0.23820) (0.22051) (0.31510) (0.25712)
Lat abs -0.311∗∗∗ -0.1637 -0.0829 0.2817 0.3109 -0.2046 0.0893 -0.29612
(0.11360) (0.36965) (0.37052) (0.33956) (0.34258) (0.32701) (0.4021) (0.37109)
Catholic -0.015∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.00132) (0.00434) (0.00434) (0.00423) (0.00427) (0.00394) (0.00608) (0.00466)
Muslim -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.00123) (0.00399) (0.0040) (0.00384) (0.00387) (0.00358) (0.00551) (0.00425)
No CPM -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.00128) (0.00418) (0.00418) (0.00412) (0.00416) (0.00384) (0.00587) (0.00455)
Intercept 40.59∗∗∗ -0.5153 -0.9532 -0.0751 -0.0582 -0.868∗ 1.273∗ -0.5242
(9.17234) (0.63504) (0.5887) (0.5026) (0.50304) (0.4965) (0.77188) (0.60704)
Time -0.020∗∗∗ No No No No Yes No Yes
(0.00457)
Observations 1025 1061 106 1025 1025 1025 1025 1025
R2 0.528 0.531 0.516 0.468 0.459 0.501 N/A2 N/A
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10.
1 Data are averaged over time periods. Sample size is reduced to the number of units.
2R2 is not available from the Hausman-Taylor estimation. The Wald-test statistic is significant
at 1% level in both cases.
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Table 2.2: Remittances and the quality of governance: parametric panel estimates.
Dependent variables: measures of the quality of governance1
rule of law regulatory quality freedom from corruption informal pay
Variable Random Haus-Taylor Random Haus-Taylor Random Haus-Taylor Between
Cratio -0.01∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗ 2.426∗∗∗
(0.00437) (0.00432) (0.0048) (0.00474) (0.16192) (0.16813) (0.85198)
Remitgdp -0.0033∗∗ -0.003∗ 0.0009 -0.00131 0.0297 0.1042∗ 0.1202
(0.00146) (0.00145) (0.00160) (0.00159) (0.55227) (0.05782) (0.25931)
Lgdppc 0.667∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 13.375∗∗∗ 11.433∗∗∗ -3.324
(0.7461) (0.8561) (0.08269) (0.09644) (1.7245) (2.5706) (6.2217)
Energy -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.0024 -0.0013 -0.197∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗
(0.00157) (0.00158) (0.00172) (0.00174) (0.05111) (0.05888) (0.32748)
Open -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.037∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.0294)
(0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00046) (0.0005) (0.01509) (0.0161) (0.06599)
Ethnic -0.2810 -0.2246 -0.3177 -0.2631 -7.517∗ -6.7215 7.8634
(0.20554) (0.25667) (0.22886) (0.29522) (4.0522) (6.7028) (12.0593)
Lat abs 0.822∗∗ 0.7611 0.0735 -0.0059 8.9922 13.757 5.5907
(0.39263) (0.48632) (0.4370) (0.55847) (7.8277) (12.842) (21.3309)
Legor UK 0.411∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗ 5.453∗∗∗ 5.474 29.155∗∗∗
(0.10508) (0.13128) (0.11702) (0.1507) (2.0548) (3.41408) (8.63689)
Legor SO -0.2226 -0.1982 0.0915 0.1144 -6.980∗∗ -7.492 19.874∗∗∗
(0.14197) (0.17644) (0.15805) (0.20288) (2.8156) (4.62017) (7.11221)
Legor GE 0.3216 0.3382 0.1261 (0.1275) -5.676 -3.4921
(0.44379) (0.55235) (0.49423) (0.63566) (8.61901) (14.3406)
Intercept -2.557∗∗ -2.776∗∗∗ -2.666∗∗∗ -2.935∗∗∗ -8.4973 -3.7995 1.2976
(0.28289) (0.34263) (0.31387) (0.38845) (6.49953) (9.96184) (26.9876)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 1025 1025 1025 1025 1025 1025 42
R2 0.503 N/A2 0.445 N/A 0.514 N/A 0.636
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10.
1Informal pay refers to informal payments to government officials (% of firms) to get things done.
2R2 is not available from the Hausman-Taylor estimation. Wald-test statistic is significant at 1% level.
50
Table 2.3: Parametric estimates with 3-year average of explanatory variables.†
Dependent variable: freedom from corruption index
Variable Pooled OLS Random-effects Random-effects Haus-Taylor
Cratio -0.547∗∗ -0.531∗ -0.535∗ -0.573∗
(0.223) (0.282) (0.0802) (0.3201)
Remitgdp -0.296∗∗∗ -0.0339 -0.072 0.0981
(0.077) (0.0898) (0.0901) (0.0990)
Lgdppc 12.454∗∗∗ 14.088∗∗∗ 13.583∗∗∗ 11.017∗∗∗
(1.359) (2.107) (2.121) (3.753)
Energy -0.323∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.2688∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.0759) (0.075) (0.1001)
Ethnic -6.684∗∗ -8.164∗ -8.495∗ -10.023
(2.823) (4.895) (4.709) (8.536)
Legor UK 5.347∗∗∗ 5.389∗∗ 5.2057 4.7804
(1.338) (2.400) (2.304) (3.9103)
Legor SO -8.371∗∗∗ -7.478∗∗ -7.739 -8.453
(1.902) (3.345) (3.222) (5.406)
Legor GE -5.134 -5.235 -5.434 -3.483
(5.150) (9.859) (9.444) (16.232)
Time No No Yes Yes
R2 0.518 0.513 0.521 N/A
Observations 350 350 350 350
Standard errors in parentheses.
†2-year average for the period 2011-12.
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Table 2.4: Remittances, household and government consumption expenditures, and con-
sumption expenditures ratio:1 parametric panel estimates.
household consumption government consumption consumption exp. ratio
Variable Random Haus-Taylor Random Haus-Taylor Random Haus-Taylor
Remitgdp 0.620∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.0265 0.025∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.04477) (0.04534) (0.01757) (0.01735) (0.01057) (0.01085)
Lgdppc -16.392∗∗∗ -23.635∗∗∗ 0.3198 -2.2015∗ -2.459∗∗∗ -2.573∗∗
(1.59638) (2.62983) (0.81623) (1.12305) (0.42674) (0.49018)
Energy -0.517∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.04387) (0.04895) (0.01850) (0.01908) (0.01076) (0.01105)
Open 0.0046 0.0018 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.0236∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.01251) (0.01296) (0.00503) (0.00500) (0.00299) (0.00301)
Ethnic 2.9513 -1.4835 0.8279 -0.1395 -2.304∗∗ -2.712∗∗
(3.96412) (7.75313) (2.18832) 3.60909 (1.09356) (1.28600)
Lat abs 6.6912 19.358 12.978∗∗∗ 17.857∗∗∗ -5.02374∗∗ -5.251∗∗
(7.63739) (14.5766) (4.19109) (6.74764) (2.10221) (2.43811)
Legor UK -3.431∗ -4.5350 2.257∗ 2.2334 -0.7476 -0.8065
(2.02044) (3.93164) (1.11846) (1.83401) (0.55812) (0.64968)
Legor SO -2.7751 -5.6494 -1.3196 -2.0506 0.6126 0.5508
(2.75611) (5.2864) (1.51489) (2.45846) (0.75869) (0.87901)
Legor GE -2.2179 0.0639 -0.7452 0.4229 -0.35214 -0.4374
(8.50950) (16.5379) (4.72324) (7.7167) (2.35407) 2.72968
Intercept (119.9610)∗∗∗ 144.676∗∗∗ 10.629∗∗∗ 19.331∗∗∗ 15.603∗∗∗ 16.166∗∗∗
(5.73194) (10.4751) (3.00107) (4.61226) (1.54674) (1.88361)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1025 1025 1025 1025 1025 1025
R2 0.668 N/A2 0.107 N/A 0.309 N/A
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10.
1 It is the ratio of household final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) to the government final
consumption expenditure (% of GDP).
2R2 is not available from the Hausman-Taylor estimation. The Wald-test statistic is significant
at 1% level in all cases.
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Table 2.5: Bandwidths for regressors in the model for the quality of governance. UB is the
upper bound for a regressor. LC and LL represent local constant and local linear estimators
respectively.
control of corrup1 rule of law regulatory quality consumption ratio2
Variable UB LC LL UB LC LL UB LC LL UB LC LL
Cratio 5.99 3.581111 0.8292202 5.99 0.6252993 0.8292202 5.99 9.833136 0.8292202
Remitgdp 15.585 8.155771 0.7172383 15.585 73451773 2.571313 15.585 4.766323 1.410357 15.585 7.963851 1.234704
Lgdppc 1.103 0.2065935 0.1680556 1.103 0.03052719 0.1680556 1.103 0.1320732 0.1682575 1.103 0.03191172 0.161775
Energy 21.15 347667175 0.5696509 21.15 24853974 0.5264752 21.15 13.08047 0.4833702 21.15 5.468488 0.486225
Open 70.28 48105520 13.36632 70.28 19250594 9.65027 70.28 106944381 9.649285 70.28 106179042 9.289601
Ethnic 0.47 0.0004119 0.071137 0.47 0.036509 0.097029 0.47 0.019563 0.0712012 0.47 0.003765 0.086439
Lat abs 0.352 8389.516 0.053557 0.352 0.001202 0.0294164 0.352 0.000878 0.053567 0.352 0.00663 0.0515683
Catholic 71.453 12963124 5.329379 71.453 3.280204 5.466731 71.453 47.59887 5.472496 71.453 28.04928 5.262417
Muslim 70.035 45.88114 1.945553 70.035 1.911099 2.033082 70.035 14510201 2.033082 70.035 40702340 1.957097
No CPM 67.121 39.3414 10.22701 67.121 9.3532 10.22701 67.121 5.696678 5.616167 67.121 1758356 9.844788
Time 6.172 0.2198784 0.375 6.172 0.000025 0.375 6.172 0.1338977 0.375 6.172 0.2960473 0.375
Observations 1025 1025 1025 1025
1 Freedom from corruption index (frcorrup) is not used to save space but the results are equivalent to that of ccorrup. Bandwidths with legal
origin variables are equivalent.
2Bandwidths for the model with consumption expenditures ratio are also shown.
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Table 2.6: Nonparametric local kernel estimates1 from the models of quality of governance.
Estimates corresponding to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the estimated parameter
distribution are reported. (labeled as Q1, Q2, and Q3.)
Dependent variable2
control of corruption rule of law regulatory quality
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
Cratio -0.071 -0.055 -0.043 -0.063 -0.0225 -0.0198 -0.0513 -0.0233 -0.019
(0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.030) (0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0254) (0.017) (0.015)
Remitgdp -0.011 -0.005 -0.004 -0.0059 -0.0040 -0.0037 -0.0082 -0.0063 -0.0058
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0076) (0.006) (0.006)
Lgdppc 0.385 0.527 0.954 0.0815 0.2332 0.6078 0.0144 0.2172 0.6301
(0.079) (0.097) (0.081) (0.095) (0.087) (0.071) (0.099) (0.039) (0.061)
Energy -0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.004) (0.004) (0.00480) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Open 0.0043 0.0045 0.0048 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.0012 0.0022 0.004
(0.0040) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0012)
Ethnic -1.742 -1.392 -1.274 -1.59 -1.294 -0.855 -0.957 -0.735 -0.624
(0.2085) (.1723) (0.1892) (0.189) (0.166) (0.378) (0.339) (0.182) (0.393)
Lat abs 0.1236 1.431 2.076 0.573 1.392 1.807 1.13 1.371 1.437
(0.993) (0.2799) (0.3287) (0.283) (0.302) (0.504) (0.383) (0.293) (0.321)
Catholic -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.006 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0012
(0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00150) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Muslim -0.0033 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0008
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
No CPM -0.0084 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0049 -0.0013 -0.0052
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0012)
Time -0.0061 0.0043 0.0049 -0.0178 -0.0108 -0.0086 -0.029 -0.016 -0.010
(0.0183) (0.0159) (0.0141) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021)
Observations 1025 1025 1025
R2 0.959 0.956 0.941
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
1 The partial effect estimates are obtained by holding all other regressors at their median.
2 Estimates from regression of freedom from corruption are equivalent and are not reported.
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Table 2.7: Nonlinearity in remittances and consumption expenditures ratio. Nonapametric
local kernel estimates1 for consumption expenditures ratio and remittances from the models
of quality of governance. Estimates corresponding to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of
the estimated parameter distribution are reported. (labeled as Q1, Q2, and Q3.)
Dependent variable2
control of corruption rule of law regulatory quality
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
Cratio≤ q1 -0.0702 -0.0531 -0.0419 -0.067 -0.022 -0.020 -0.053 -0.022 -0.019
(0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.032) (0.017) (0.013) (0.052) (0.016) (0.014)
q1<Cratio≤ q2 -0.0631 -0.0534 -0.0424 -0.0517 -0.0212 -0.0198 -0.0487 -0.0224 -0.0188
(0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.027) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.016) (0.014)
q2<Cratio≤ q3 -0.0735 -0.0603 -0.0447 -0.0606 -0.0264 -0.0202 -0.053 -0.029 -0.019
(0.036) (0.017) (0.014) (0.030) (0.019) (0.013) (0.063) (0.019) (0.014)
Cratio>q3 -0.076 -0.055 -0.044 -0.063 -0.0234 -0.0194 -0.051 -0.023 -0.019
(0.034) (0.016) (0.014) (0.031) (0.017) (0.013) (0.048) (0.016) (0.014)
Remitgdp≤ q1 -0.019 0.0057 0.0045 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
q1<Remitgdp≤ q2 -0.017 -0.0086 -0.0047 -0.010 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012 -0.008 -0.006
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
q2<Remitgdp≤ q3 -0.011 -0.0054 -0.0045 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.029) (0.022) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Remitgdp>q3 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 1025 1025 1025
R2 0.959 0.956 0.941
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. q1, q2, and q3 represent lower quartile, median,
and upper quartile for consumption expenditures ratio and remittances.
1 The partial effects are obtained by holding all other regressors at their median.
2 Estimates from regression of freedom from corruption are equivalent (not reported).
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Table 2.8: Remittances, household and government consumption expenditures, and con-
sumption expenditures ratio: Nonparametric local kernel estimates1. Estimates correspond-
ing to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the estimated parameter distribution are
reported. (labeled as Q1, Q2, and Q3.)
Dependent variable
household consumption government consumption consumption exp. ratio
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
Remitgdp 0.029 0.053 0.251 -0.0697 -0.0464 -0.0408 0.0132 0.0166 0.0351
(0.142) (0.145) (0.191) (0.0506) (0.0439) (0.0433) (0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0237)
Lgdppc -17.550 -8.069 -2.805 0.0224 0.9914 4.467 -2.463 -0.7868 -0.1771
(2.133) (1.763) (0.081) (0.0438) (0.555) (0.595) (0.259) (0.311) (0.159)
Energy 0.047 0.047 0.057 -0.0395 -0.0282 -0.0276 0.0117 0.0118 0.015
(0.1070) (0.1072) (0.108) (0.0343) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0146)
Open -0.0908 -0.0526 0.0606 -0.0102 0.0315 0.0423 -0.0176 -0.0119 0.0055
(0.0373) (0.0328) (0.0289) (0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0116) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0035)
Ethnic -0.3342 7.684 19.31 -3.362 0.9564 10.220 -3.313 1.109 1.188
(12.060) (3.215) (4.143) (1.177) (1.482) (2.862) (1.579) (0.518) (0.609)
Lat abs -39.470 -20.72 11.70 -1.455 8.903 15.430 -7.146 -3.953 1.382
(7.517) (6.437) (7.533) (2.412) (1.967) (3.412) (1.101) (0.857) (0.997)
Catholic 0.0678 0.0688 0.0847 -0.0395 -0.0151 -0.0056 0.0052 0.0087 0.0202
(0.0366) (0.0355) (0.0306) (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0107) (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0045)
Muslim 0.0834 0.0835 0.0979 -0.0401 -0.0325 -0.0325 0.01463 0.01463 0.0179
(0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0328) (0.0101) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0044)
No CPM -0.0760 0.0118 0.0282 -0.0649 -0.0514 -0.0396 0.0092 0.0106 0.0239
(0.0333) (0.0329) (0.0316) (0.0095) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0050) (0.0044) (0.0046)
Time -0.2098 -0.0215 0.8338 -0.1898 -0.0408 0.0811 0.0051 0.0175 0.0640
(0.3734) (0.3424) (0.3730) (0.1123) (0.1120) (0.1242) (0.057) (0.045) (0.051)
Observations 1025 1025 1025
R2 0.928 0.886 0.882
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
1 The partial effect estimates are obtained by holding all other regressors at their median.
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Table 2.9: Nonparametric percentile estimates for remittances from regressions in Table 2.8,
but at some specific ranges of the coefficient distribution.
Percentiles
Dependent variable:
household consumption 75th 80th 85th 90th 95th
Remitgdp 0.251 0.455 0.757 1.234 2.155
(0.191) (0.0235) (0.299) (0.398) (0.601)
Percentiles
Dependent variable:
government consumption 5th 10th 15th 20th 25th
Remitgdp -0.199 -0.1506 -0.1117 -0.0808 -0.0697
(0.1202) (0.085) (0.067) (0.054) (0.0506)
Percentiles
Dependent variable:
consumption exp. ratio 75th 80th 85th 90th 95th
Remitgdp 0.0351 0.0563 0.0794 0.1332 0.1824
(0.023) (0.029) (0.035) (0.052) (0.069)
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.10: Nonparametric partial estimates for remittances from the regression model of
government consumption expenditure in Table 2.8, obtained by splitting remittances data
values into four groups by its quartiles. Reported estimates, denoted by Q1, Q2, and Q3,
are the quartile values for each of the four groups.
Dependent variable: control of corruption
Variable/level Q1 Q2 Q3
Remitgdp≤ q1 -0.0749 -0.0469 -0.0405
(0.052) (0.043) (0.043)
q1<Remitgdp≤ q2 -0.0781 -0.0454 -0.0413
(0.053) (0.043) (0.043)
q2<Remitgdp≤ q3 -0.0702 -0.0450 -0.0398
(0.050) (0.043) (0.043)
Remitgdp>q3 -0.0603 -0.0482 -0.0422
(0.047) (0.044) (0.043)
Observations 1025
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. 1Estimates for other explanatory variables are not reported.
Note: q1, q2, and q3 are the quartiles for remittances data values.
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Table 2.11: Local constant bandwidths1 for the instrumental variables (IV) estimation.
Dependent variable: control of corruption Dependent variable: remittances
Variable UB LC UB LC
Cratio 5.99 5.364492 5.99 4.96538000
Remitgdp 15.585 6.758626
Lgdppc02 1.103 0.000984 1.103 0.552203
Energy 21.15 76079762 21.15 2.457601
Open 70.28 69364992 70.28 22.97405
Ethnic 0.47 0.097254 0.47 0.1660083
Lnd100km 0.672 158394 0.672 0.09880469
Lat abs 0.352 35345.65 0.352 0.08044254
Catholic 71.453 11.20937 71.453 6.275609
Muslim 70.035 6179471 70.035 120.5691
No CPM 67.121 6403198 67.121 118.3021
Time 6.172 0.217505 6.172 0.2722974
n 1025 1025
1 Bandwidths from local linear estimator are less than the upper bound for all regressors
but are not reported.
Table 2.12: Partial effects estimates from the instrumental variables (IV) estimation1 for
consumption expenditures ratio. Estimates corresponding to the 25th, 50th, and 75th per-
centiles of the estimated parameter distribution (labeled as Q1, Q2, and Q3) are reported.
The partial effects are also presented by splitting the levels of the consumption expenditures
ratio by its median value.
Dependent variable: control of corruption
Variable/level Q1 Q2 Q3
Cratio -0.062 -0.061 -0.060
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Cratio≤ q2 -0.063 -0.061 -0.059
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Cratio>q2 -0.062 -0.061 -0.060
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Observations 1025
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. 1Estimates for other explanatory variables are not reported.
Note: q2 is the median value of consumption expenditures ratio.
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Table 2.13: Summary Statistics
Variable name Number of observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Remittances (% of GDP) 1025 5.115311 7.792558 0.000039 59.3088
Consumption expenditures ratio 1025 5.625744 2.99483 1.180914 24.10644
Log of GDP (in constant US$) 1025 3.298645 0.5514861 2.124374 4.464248
Energy depletion (% of GNI) 1025 5.034874 10.57469 0 83.2803
Open (sum of imports and exports, % of GDP) 1025 82.90656 35.13784 22.1183 210.374
Ethinic fractionalization 1025 0.4842346 0.2333098 0.002 0.9302
Latitude 1025 0.2734577 0.1757839 0.0111111 0.6666667
Coastal area (% of total area) 1025 0.3164137 0.3361212 0 1
Catholic (% of total population) 1025 29.93102 35.72647 0 96.6
Muslim (% of total population) 1025 25.11464 35.01772 0 99.4
Protestant (% of total population) 1025 6.646244 12.30759 0 66
No CPM (other religions, % of total population) 1025 38.30809 33.56066 0.3999985 100
British legal origin 1025 0.2439024 0.4296442 0 1
Socialist legal origin 1025 0.2887805 0.4534169 0 1
German commercial code 1025 0.0107317 0.1030869 0 1
French commercial code 1025 0.4565854 0.4983548 0 1
Control of corruption 1025 -0.3591221 0.6492613 -1.5242 2.4622
Rule and law 1025 -0.3513665 0.6771783 -1.78744 1.93633
Regulatory quality 1025 -0.1653386 0.6934012 -1.69172 1.96706
Freedom from corruption 1025 32.8722 14.42966 4 96
Informal payment to officials 42 1.308803 0.3209333 0.447158 1.858357
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Chapter 3
Do Remittances Promote Financial
Inclusion?∗
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, the provision of financial services has been considered as the most useful
mechanism for reducing poverty in developing countries. Such a provision of financial services
to households is termed as financial inclusion. Fully inclusive financial system offering a wide
range of services including savings, credit, payment, and insurance is expected to provide
much benefits to poor households, ethnic groups, and rural communities. Conroy (2008)
argues that financial inclusion focuses attention on the need to bring previously excluded
people under the umbrella of financial institutions. The Center for Financial Inclusion (CFI)
defines full financial inclusion as a state in which everyone who can use them has access to
a range of quality financial services at affordable prices, with convenience, dignity, and
consumer protections, delivered by a range of providers in a stable, competitive market to
financially capable clients.
∗I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Feng Yao, for his guidance throughout this research work. I
am thankful to Prof. Stratford Douglas, Prof. Arabinda Basistha, Prof. Andrew Young, and Prof. Philip
Michelbach for their constructive comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are mine.
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In this essay, we take up an important research question of whether the inflow of re-
mittances promotes financial inclusion in the recipient countries. Our measure of financial
inclusion comes from two aspects of financial inclusion: ‘access’ and ‘usage’ of formal finan-
cial services. In general, access and usage are the two basic dimensions of financial inclusion.
Access refers to the ability to use the services and products offered by formal financial insti-
tutions. Determining levels of access may require identifying and analyzing potential barriers
to opening and using a bank account. Rather than using intangible measures of access, we
directly use the “percentage of people having an account at a formal financial institution ”
across countries to incorporate the access dimension. Usage refers to the depth or extent of
financial services and product use. Determining usage requires gathering details about the
regularity, frequency and duration of use over time (FIDWG, AFI, 2013). With respect to
the usage dimension, we use the “percentage of people that have saved some money at a
formal financial institution in the past year” across countries.
Several studies and country experiences show that the expansion of financial access and
promotion of banking habit among the people help expand economic activities. Many gov-
ernments around the world have devised policy measures to promote branchless banking
and mobile banking to increase people′s access to financial services. Branchless banking is
a distribution channel strategy used for delivering financial services to the grass roots of
the economy that does not rely on bank branches. Other such policies as facilitating saving
and credit cooperatives in particular, are believed to be an important mechanism in gener-
ating employment, increasing income, and alleviating poverty. These measures help ensure
the participation of poor households, disadvantaged groups, and rural communities into the
main stream of the financial system.
As an increased level of financial inclusion supports both economic efficiency and equity,
remittances may have potential impacts on economic growth and development through their
contribution to financial deepening and more equitable distribution. Though the literature
paid much attention to the effects of remittances on financial development (Agarwal et al.,
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2012), poverty (Adams and Page, 2005; Acosta et al., 2007; Gupta et al., 2009), health
and education (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2007), consumption
(Rempel and Lodbell, 1977; Adams and Page, 2005), investment and growth (Yang, 2005;
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Dupas and Robinson, 2009); their impact on financial
inclusion has relatively been ignored. The receipts of remittances are expected to enhance
the financial resources of the recipient households, thereby leading to increased demand for
several kinds of financial services and products from the formal financial institutions.
When households receive remittances, the first thing they do usually include paying off
the loans they have owed. As remittances are sent in installments with varying frequencies,
the recipient households would like to store the money at a safer place so as to use it once
needs arise. The households may use the money to purchase goods and services such as basic
necessities, durable items and luxury goods, and utility bills. The money could be used to pay
for children′s school fees and uniform, books, and other similar materials. Households may
require to put some money aside to pay the doctor′s bill in case its family members get sick.
By adding to remittances income over time, household can accumulate funds to buy housing
or to finance business investment. In sum, remittances may increase households′ demands for
savings account, payment and insurance services, and credit instruments. On the flip side,
however, remittances may drive up consumption expenditure, lower savings, and reduce the
demands for financial products and services as persistence flow of remittances might provide
households insurance against future income shocks. Also, depending upon the social norms
and practices, customs, and level of financial development, demand for traditional means
of financial products and services may rise when remittances increase, thereby lowering the
scope of formal financial institutions.
Anzoategui et al. (2013) claim that remittances could potentially affect financial inclusion
in several ways. The fixed costs of sending remittances can make these flows lumpy. As a re-
sult, households possess excess cash for some period of time. This leads to increased demand
for deposit accounts from formal financial institutions. Similarly, processing remittances
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flows provide financial institutions with information on the income of recipient households
that might make those institutions better willing and able to extend loans to otherwise
opaque borrowers. However, if remittances help relax households′ financing constraints, the
demand for credit instruments might fall with the rise in remittances.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews major issues in financial
inclusion literature in relation to remittances. Section 3.3 presents our empirical approach,
thereby highlighting the importance of semiparametric partially linear model (PLM) in the
analysis along with a brief description of the data and variables. The empirical findings are
discussed in section 3.4 and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
The issue of inclusive finance has always been on the focus of many governments around the
world. Policy makers and researchers have been concerned with this issue for years because of
its perceived benefits. In the past decade, the multilateral agencies have promoted this issue
as a means to improve economic growth, to reduce poverty, and promote social inclusion.
Recently financial inclusion is even described as a complementary process to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing (Koker Jentzsch, p.268, 2013). This is because the use
of formal financial services increases transparency, thereby increasing the monitoring and
surveillance capabilities of law enforcement agencies.
With rapid growth of technology in financial transactions, financial inclusion has been
combined with mobile banking, SIM card registration, and other modern means of trans-
actions as well. In this essay, however, financial inclusion is considered in a very general
sense-process of ensuring the access and usage of formal financial services and products by
those who are willing but not able to do so yet. Sarma and Pais (2008) define financial
inclusion as a process that ensures the ease of access, availability, and usage of the formal
financial system for all members of an economy. It has been estimated that about 2.5 billion
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working-age adult globally are unbanked, and do not have access to the types of formal
financial services delivered by regulated financial institutions. In the context of Africa, less
than a quarter of adults have an account with a formal financial institution and that many
adults use informal methods to save and borrow (Kunt and Klapper, World Bank, 2012).
The reasons of being unbanked include poverty, costs, travel distance, and often-burdensome
requirements involved in opening an account (Projects and Operations, World Bank, 2013).
This is a state of affairs of most of the developing countries with poor resources base and
with a meager financial infrastructure.
In the context of substantial increase in size and rate of remittances inflows to the de-
veloping world for the last three decades, researchers have put more efforts to study the
impacts of remittances on several economic variables. While previous research in the 1970s
and 1980s was centered on the short-run effects of remittances, the research focus has shifted
to the long-run impacts of remittances, especially in the dynamics of inequality, finance, en-
trepreneurship, and development (e.g., Rapoport & Docquier, 2004). Recently, researchers
and policymakers have emphasized the impact of remittances on financial inclusion. Em-
pirical studies have shown that financial inclusion is associated with productive investment
(Dupas and Rabinson, 2009), financial development (Toxopeus and Lensink, 2007), and
overall economic development (Sarma and Pais, 2008). As financial deepening has a posi-
tive relationship with financial inclusion, studies have addressed the impacts of remittances
in different aspects of financial sector development as well. Aggarwal et al. (2012) study
the impacts of remittances on deposits and credits intermediated by local banking sector
in developing countries and conclude that remittances promote financial development in
developing countries.
Remittances received by households and small businesses are likely to increase the level
and scope of financial resources available to them. Moreover, receiving remittances is a
recurrent phenomenon for the recipients. The result may be increased demands of saving
instruments in the form of deposit accounts in the remittances receiving country. Using
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household-level survey data for El Salvador, Anzoategui et al. (2013) finds that remittances
have a positive impact on financial inclusion by promoting the use of deposit accounts,
but they do not have a significant effect on the demand for and use of credit from formal
institutions.
On the supply side, the role of government in bringing a larger proportion of the ‘un-
banked’population into the ‘banked’sector can be significant. Governments of remittance
recipient countries must be able to establish sound policy measures to improve the range of
money transmission services provided to migrants through formal banking channels (Cooray
A., 2012). Cooray finds that migrant remittances affect the size and efficiency of financial
sector through government ownership of banks. He claims that government can lead to finan-
cial literacy programs and can improve infrastructure necessary for the provision of financial
services that ultimately leads to financial inclusiveness.
Financial inclusion requires the existence of several financial institutions with sound reg-
ulatory framework. In such environment, they can collectively offer appropriate financial
products and services to all segments of the population in an economy. The effective regu-
latory quality is vital for financial inclusion process. In most developing countries, financial
services are only available to a minority of population. Mainstream for-profit financial in-
stitutions have largely ignored the segment of the market that includes the low income and
poor households, as well as small- and medium-sized enterprises, often called the “missing
middle” (United Nations, 2006).
In addition to persistent market imperfections, developing countries are characterized
by other socio-economic dimensions such as high levels of poverty, income inequality, and
income volatility. These factors require risk-diversification, consumption smoothing, and
intergenerational financing of investment. This is the reason why the demand for and use of
saving and credit instruments are so critical in such countries. Since remittances are likely
to have important effects on each of these dimensions, their impacts on the economy and
particularly on the process of financial inclusion are likely to be quite large.
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The effects of remittances on inclusive finance may not transpire in isolation. The level
of financial development as well as the market oriented government policies may have direct
impacts on financial sector outcomes. The financial sector policies of the government includ-
ing its regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector devel-
opment (WGI, World Bank). It measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies. Unless
ensuring the effectiveness of business friendly policies, financial sector remains vulnerable to
greater risks and uncertainty. In such circumstances, the process of integrating households
and small enterprises into formal financial sectors cannot be ensured.
The financial infrastructures in many developing countries are not only insufficient, but
they are also extremely fragile. Because of the existence of high costs of receiving banking
services, long travel distance, high poverty and lack of creditworthiness of lower income bor-
rowers and small firms with little collateral, larger segments of population have been forced
to undertake financial transactions with informal financial sectors. The inadequate financial
infrastructure may create huge financial barriers on the part of individual households and
small firms. With lower households income and wealth, these barriers may further jeopar-
dize their needs as well as interests of joining with the formal financial sector. The higher
remittances inflows might make financial transactions more profitable for many banking and
financial institutions, which otherwise would continue to remain sluggish or would engage in
speculative activities.
3.3 Empirical methodology and data
We investigate the relationship between remittances and financial inclusion by analyzing the
following semiparametric partially linear model:
Financial inclusioni = g(Zi) +X
′
iβ + ui, i = 0, 1, . . . , n. (3.1)
66
Where, Xi is a p × 1 vector, β is a p × 1 vector of unknown parameters, and the
functional form of g(Zi) is left unspecified. The model specification (3.1) is described
as semiparametric because it contains both finite-dimensional (i.e., parametric) compo-
nent and infinite-dimensional (i.e., nonparametric) component. The data is assumed to be
i.i.d. with E(ui|Xi, Zi) = 0, and we allow for a conditionally heteroskedastic error process
E(u2i |x, z) = σ2(x, z) of unknown form. The model (3.1) specifies conditional mean as linear
in Xi but nonlinear in Zi (remittances). Our goal is to estimate β and g(.) consistently and
to obtain the confidence intervals. Since g(.) is unconstrained, the identification condition
is that elements of Xi cannot be collinear with any function of remittances. This means
that an intercept term cannot be identified in a partially linear model and is excluded from
specification (3.1). The model specification (3.1) can be estimated by using the method of
Robinson (1988).
We estimate the model (3.1) by controlling for a set of key socio-economic, legal, and
infrastructural factors across countries represented by the matrix X that the remittances
literature has found to affect financial inclusion (e. g. Anzoategui et al., 2013; Sarma and
Pais, 2008). For comparison purpose, however, we will also present the results by estimating
the linear parametric versions of model (3.1).
The financial inclusion indicator variables come from the 2011 Global Financial Inclusion
(Global Findex) Database compiled by the World Bank. Our dependent variable is a financial
inclusion index which is computed from each of the following two key indicators of financial
inclusion for every country in the dataset: 1) percentage of people having an account at a
formal financial institution (regarded as an accessibility dimension of financial inclusion and
considered as a proxy for the demand for deposit instruments), and 2) percentage of people
who saved money into an account at a formal financial institution (regarded as a usage
dimension of financial inclusion and considered as a proxy for the extent of using deposit
instruments). A composite index of financial inclusion is also computed by combining these
two indicators (see Appendix, Table 3.1, for details).
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The variable of interest is the inflow of personal remittances, received (% of GDP).
Remittances are defined as the sum of worker′s remittances, compensation of employees, and
migrant′s transfers in the balance of payments. Workers′ remittances are the current transfers
made by migrants who are employed and resident in another country. Compensation of
employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are
employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident
entities. Finally, migrant transfers consist of the financial items that arise from the migration
or change of residence of individuals from one country to another. The aggregated data for
remittances come from WDI.
The control variables represented by matrix X includes real GDP per capita, primary
school enrollment (% of gross), rural population (% of total population), and telephone lines
(per 100 people). These variables come from WDI. Similarly, it includes the legal origin
variables (defined in terms of binary variables for British common law, Socialist/communist
laws, and French, Germany, and Scandinavian commercial codes) that are obtained from the
Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID).
Our cross-sectional dataset consists of 81 countries based on the availability of data
that excludes the Group of Seven (G7) countries, Western European OECD countries, and
Australia. The reason is that these countries are structurally different from the rest of the
world regarding financial infrastructure and their responses to remittances. The data set is
available from the authors upon request. A detail description of the variables is included in
Appendix, Table 3.1.
The dependent variable ‘financial inclusion’ is computed using the methodology em-
ployed by Sarma (2008). This approach of calculating index of financial inclusion (IFI) is
similar to that used by UNDP for computation of some well-known development indices
such as the HDI (Human Development Index), the HPI (Human Poverty Index) etc. Ac-
cordingly, the index of financial inclusion (IFI) in this paper is computed first by calculating
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a dimension index, di, for a given dimension of financial inclusion by the following formula.
di =
Ai −mi
Mi −mi ; 0 ≤ di ≤ 1. (3.2)
Where, i = 1, 2, . . . , n; Ai =actual value of dimension i; mi =lower limit for dimension i,
given by the observed minimum for dimension i; Mi =upper limit for dimension i, given by
the observed maximum for dimension i.
After calculating the dimension indexes, di, for various dimensions of financial inclusion in
a country, the comprehensive index of financial inclusion (IFI) for the country, i, is calculated
by using the following formula:
IFIi = 1−
√
(1− d1)2 + (1− d2)2 + · · ·+ (1− dn)2√
n
; 0 ≤ IFIi ≤ 1. (3.3)
Finally, to ensure that the index ranges from −∞ to +∞ while still preserving the order,
the “Financial Inclusion” index (dependent variable) in this analysis is derived from the
expression (3.3) as follows:
Financial inclusioni = ln(
IFIi
1− IFIi ) (3.4)
In the present analysis, either a single indicator of financial inclusion or a combination of
two indicators of financial inclusion are used for computing the index of financial inclusion
for a given country. It is because one of the objectives of this empirical study is to make a
comparison of impact of remittances on each dimension of financial inclusion across countries.
3.4 Empirical findings
As described in section 3.3, the financial inclusion index (dependent variable) is computed
from a particular indicator or set of indicators of financial inclusion. As our major goal is
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to examine the impact of remittances on the demand for and use of deposit instruments
across countries, the result of analysis with a each individual dimension of financial inclusion
indicator is very important for us. By taking this objective into consideration, we first
consider the following two indicators of financial inclusion for a country as a whole: 1)
account at a formal financial institution, (% age 15+), and 2) saved at a financial institution
in the past year (% age 15+). The first indicator is a proxy for the accessibility dimension
(e.g. demand for deposit instruments so as to access the financial services) and the second
indicator is a proxy for the usage dimension (e.g. saving money by making use of deposit
instruments) of financial inclusion. We first compute a composite financial inclusion index
by combining both of these indicators and study the impact of remittances on this aggregate
index of financial inclusion. Then we compute a single dimensional index of financial inclusion
by using each of the two indicators separately and study the impact of remittances on each
individual dimension.
Table 3.2 presents the results of estimation of the semiparametric partially linear model
(3.1) using the method of Robinson (1988). The dependent variable is the composite financial
inclusion index for a country as a whole that is derived from two indicators of financial inclu-
sion as described in the previous paragraph. The local linear quartile coefficients estimates
for remittances are negative and statistically significant, though the coefficient variation is
not too wide between lower and upper quartiles. This finding is against the general expecta-
tion that remittances lead to greater financial inclusion. From the results in the parametric
part, we also find that real GDP per capita, British legal origin, and the telephone lines
(a proxy for economic infrastructure) all are found to have positive and significant impact
on financial inclusion as expected. The coefficient estimate with primary school enrollment
(a proxy for education/literacy) appears with positive sign and the size of rural population
appears with a negative coefficient, both are as expected.
we are basically interested in examining the impact of remittances separately on acces-
sibility and usage dimension of financial inclusion across countries. We present the results
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of this analysis in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. From local linear quartile coefficient estimates
for remittances in Table 3.3, we find that remittances do not affect the demand for deposit
instruments at the country level. However, results from Table 3.4 show that remittances
have a significant negative impact on the use of deposit instruments across countries.
To strengthen our understanding of the potential differential impacts of remittances on
the demand for deposit instruments and use of such instruments (i.e., savings), we analyze
the relationship between remittances and these variables not only separately but also at the
rural-sector and urban-sector, taken one at a time. This analysis is expected to shed light
on how the behavior of remittance-recipient households in these two parts of an economy
differs. Tables 3.5 to 3.10 present the results of such analyses. From the first three of
these tables, tables 3.5 - 3.7, we find that while all other control variables have similar
expected sign and significance level in almost every case, the local linear quartile coefficient
estimates with remittances are found to be negative and statistically significant, indicating
that remittances have adverse impact on the demand for deposit instruments and use of such
instruments across rural regions of an economy. These findings are, therefore, in contrast
with the results from remaining three tables, that is, tables 3.8 - 3.10. In other words,
remittances are not found to have any statistically significant impact on deposit instruments
in the urban sector of an economy. We argue that remittance recipients in the rural regions
are attracted more towards informal financing methods. Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2013)
claim that use of informal and community-based saving methods (e. g. rotating saving clubs)
are very widespread (such as in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Kenya). So when remittances inflow
rise, the informal methods of saving might have become more popular than formal methods,
thereby causing a decline in both the demand for deposit account and frequency of savings
in rural areas. Moreover, rather than demanding deposit accounts at banks or other formal
institutions, remittance-recipients might have loaned out money informally to their relatives,
friends, neighbors, or other close connections with the hope of getting higher interest income
because banks usually pay a very low rate of interest on deposits.
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In the second phase, we estimate linear parametric versions of above semiparametric
models. Remittances variable is taken in ‘levels’ in these estimations. The resulting OLS
estimates are presented in tables 3.11 - 3.13. The parameter estimate associated with remit-
tances for the usage (of deposit instruments) dimension at the country-level is found to be
negative and statistically significant at 1% level. Although, for the country-level, coefficient
estimates on remittances in models of composite index and accessibility dimension are neg-
ative, they are not statistically significant at convenient levels. The estimation outputs for
these models using rural-sector data provide exactly the same conclusion as in the case of
country-level data. However, the results from urban-sector data indicate a bit different sce-
nario. None of the estimates associated with remittances are statistically significant, though
they all come up with a negative sign. Overall, these parametric results provide a consistent
and full supports for our findings from above semiparametric analysis.
In the third and final phase of analysis, we now estimate all the same models but now
looking at the impact of change in remittances (as a % of GDP) from one year to the next
on the indexes of financial inclusion. That is, we address the issue of spurious regression
and nonstationarity of remittances inflows by considering its first-differences. The estimated
parameter coefficients are shown in tables 3.14 - 3.16. These results, still reinforcing our
previous findings, however are quite more impressive. The estimates associated with remit-
tances in all models and for all levels of data (e.g., country, rural, or urban) are negative
and statistically significant, definitely indicating a more adverse impact of remittances on
inclusive finance and the financial inclusion.
Taken together, the findings from our three phases of econometric analysis evidently
suggest that the rural sectors across developing countries have been persistently facing the
deficiency of financial infrastructures, and most of the people who have been migrated from
the rural regions are still unable to access and use the financial services and products offered
by the formal financial institutions. The reasons may include the existence of high costs of
receiving banking services, long travel distance, high poverty and lack of creditworthiness of
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lower income borrowers and small firms with little assets and collateral. So we conjecture
that the persistent inflow of remittances might provide the recipient households insurance
against future income shocks, thereby causing a decline in savings, while at the same time
pushing up the household consumption expenditure. Overall, the inflow of remittances alone
are not found to promote financial inclusion in the developing countries.
3.5 Concluding remarks
In this essay, we examined the relationship between the inflow of remittances and financial in-
clusion across countries. Using cross-sectional data for 2011, we estimated the cross-country
regression models by controlling the key socio-economic, legal, and infrastructural charac-
teristics. We employed semiparametric partially linear model to allow the nonlinearity and
heterogeneity in partial effects of remittances on financial inclusion. We find that remit-
tances have a significant negative impact on savings across countries, but have no impact
on the demand for saving instruments. Once the data is disaggregated at rural and urban
levels, remittances are found to have adverse impacts on demand for deposit instruments
and on savings in the rural sector, but not in the case of urban sector. These findings clearly
suggest that the rural sector has been facing the deficiency of financial infrastructures across
countries, and most of the people who have been migrated from the rural regions are still
unable to access and use financial products and services offered by the formal financial in-
stitutions. Instead, persistent remittances inflows may protect recipient households from
financial risks by ensuring them against future income shocks, such as those generated from
business cycles, political crisis, natural disasters or other domestic vulnerabilities, thereby
causing a decline in savings.
The findings from our empirical study are in contrary to the results of Anzoategui et
al.(2013) who use household-level survey data for El Salvador to study the impact of re-
mittances on financial inclusion. They show that remittances promote the use of deposit
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accounts, but they do not have a significant effect on the demand for and use of credits from
formal financial institutions. This discrepancy might have arose due to some country-specific
features or because of differences in data dimensions. (Theirs data come from a survey of
individual households but ours is cross-sectional country level data.)
We have employed only two basic dimensions of financial inclusion in this study and ad-
dressed the issue in qualitative terms. But there remains many aspects of financial inclusion
where remittances could have played a dynamic role in shaping the behaviors of households
and financial institutions. We will take up one of these issues, namely, the impact of re-
mittances on business regulations and entrepreneurial environment in next chapter. The
potential avenues for future research with regards to financial inclusion may include the use
of more accurate, comprehensive data and flexible econometric tools that could shed light
on why and to what extent remittances affect not only the access to and use of deposit and
credit instruments, but also of many other financial products and services offered by formal
financial institutions that may direct the course of financial inclusion across countries in
coming decades.
74
3.6 Bibliography
1. Abdih, Y., Ralph Chami, Jihad Dagher, and Peter Montiel (2012), Remittances and
Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?, World Development, Vol. 40, pp. 657-666.
2. Acosta, P., Corporacion Andina de Fomento, Pablo Fajnzylber and J. Humberto Lopez,
(2007), The Impact of Remittances on Poverty and Human Capital: Evidence from Latin
American Household Surveys, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4247.
3. Adams, R. H., and John Page (2005), Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce
Poverty in Developing Countries?, World Development Vol. 33, No. 10, pp. 16451669.
4. Amuedo-Dorantes, C., Sainz, T. and Pozo, S., (2007)., Remittances and healthcare ex-
penditure patterns of population in origin communities: Evidence from Mexico, INTAL-ITD
Working paper 25.
5. Anzoategui, D., Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Maria Soledad Martinez (2013), Remittances and
Financial Inclusion: Evidence from El Salvador, World Development, Vol. 54, pp. 338-349.
6. Aggarwal, R., Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria (2012), Do remit-
tances promote financial development?, Journal of Development Economics, 96(2), 255-264.
7. Angle, R. F., C. W. J. Granger, John Rice, and Andrew Weiss (1986), Semiparametric
estimates of the relation between weather and electricity sales, Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 81, 310-320.
8. Batu, M. B., (2010), On the Nonlinearity of Remittances and Economic Growth, Univer-
sity of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario.
9. Beck, T., Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria (2005), reaching out:
Access to and use of banking services across countries, WPS3754, World Bank Policy Re-
search Working Paper 3754.
10. Building Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development, United Nations, New York.
75
11. Cooray, A., (2005) Migrant remittances, financial sector development and the government
ownership of banks, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, Australia.
12. Conroy, J. D., (2005) Financial inclusion: A new microfinance initiative for APEC, The
Foundation for Development Cooperation, Microfinance Workshop, The APEC Business
Advisory Council, Jakarta.
13. Cox-Edwards, A. and Ureta, M., (2003), International migration, remittances, and
schooling: Evidence from El Salvador, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper 9766.
14. Demirguc-Kunt, A., and Leora Klapper (2013), Measuring financial inclusion: Explain-
ing variation in use of financial services across and within countries, Brookings paper in
economic activity.
15. Dupas, P. and Robinson, J., (2009), Savings constraints and microenterprise develop-
ment: Evidence from a field Experiment in Kenya, National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 14693.
16 Financial Inclusion Data Working Group (FIDWG), Alliance for Financial Inclusion
(AFI).
17. Giuliano, P. and Ruiz-Arranz, M., (2009), Remittances, financial development, and
growth, Journal of Development Economics 90, 144-152.
18. Gupta, S., Pattillo, C., and Wagh, S., (2009), Effect of remittances on poverty and
financial development in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Development 37(1), 104-115.
19. Hardle, W., Hua Liang, Jiti Gao (2000), Partially Linear Models.
20. Koker L. D., and Nicola Jentzsch, (2013), Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity:
Aligned Incentive?, World Development, Vol. 44, pp. 267-280.
21. Kunt, A. D., and Leora Klapper, (2012), Financial Inclusion in Africa, The World Bank.
76
22. Li, Q., and Jeffery S. Racine, (2007), Nonparametric Econometrics, Princeton University
Press.
23. Racine, J. S., (2008), Nonparametric and Semi-parametric methods in R.
24. Rempel, H., and Lobdell, R. A. (1977), The Role of Urabn-Rural Remittances in Rural
Development, University of Manitoba.
25. Rapoport, H., and Frederic Docquier, (2004), The Economics of Migrant′s Remittances,
Stanford Center for International Development, Working Paper No. 236.
26. Robinson, P. M. (1988), Root-N-Consistent Semiparametric Regression, Econometrica,
Vol. 56, Issue 4, 931-954.
27. Sarma, M., and Jesim Pais, (2008), Financial Inclusion and Development: A Cross
Country Analysis.
28. Stiegler, U., (2013), Migrants′ money for financial inclusion? Doctoral Thesis, Depart-
ment of Political and Social Science, Freie University, Berlin.
29. Toxopeus, H. S., and Robert Lensink (2007), Remittances and Financial Inclusion in
Development, Research Paper No. 2007/49, UNU-WIDER.
30. Yang, D. (2005)., International migration, human capital, and entrepreneurship: Evi-
dence from Philippine migrants exchange rate shocks, Mimeo, University of Michigan.
77
3.7 Appendix
Table 3.1: Description of the indicators of financial inclusion and other explanatory variables,
and their data sources.
Variable Description Source
Indicator Account at a formal financial institution (% age 15+) Global Findex, WB
Indicator Account at a formal financial institution, rural (% age 15+) Global Findex, WB
Indicator Account at a formal financial institution, urban (% age 15+) Global Findex, WB
Indicator Saved at a financial institution in the past year (% age 15+) Global Findex, WB
Indicator Saved at a financial institution in the past year, rural (% age 15+) Global Findex, WB
Indicator Saved at a financial institution in the past year, urban (% age 15+) Global Findex, WB
Remit Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) WDI, WB
Lgdppc GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) WDI, WB
Legor UK Binary variable for British common law CID
Legor SO Binary variable for Socialist law CID
Legor GE Binary variable for German commercial code CID
Legor FR Binary variable for French commercial code CID
Legor SC Binary variable for Scandinavian commercial code CID
School pri School enrollment, primary (% gross) WDI, WB
Pop ruralp Rural population (% of total population) WDI, WB
Tele100 Telephone lines (per 100 people) WDI, WB
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Table 3.2: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
composite index of financial inclusion, country-level.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit -0.0092 -0.0091 -0.009
(0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Lgdppc 0.5493
(0.2834)
Legor UK 0.6645
(0.2356)
Legor SO -0.0003
(0.2356)
Legor GE -0.0038
(0.7746)
School pri 0.0076
(0.0065)
Pop ruralp -0.0042
(0.0071)
Tele100 0.0114
(0.0094)
R2 0.49
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ The composite index of financial inclusion is computed from the following two indicators of financial
inclusion: 1) Account at a formal financial institution, (% age 15+), and 2) Saved at a financial
institution in the past year (% age 15+).
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Table 3.3: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
index of financial inclusion for account at a formal financial institution, country-level.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit -0.0513 0.0016 0.0587
(0.0996) (0.0076) (0.0776)
Lgdppc 0.7228
(0.3136)
Legor UK 0.6796
(0.2608)
Legor SO 0.2489
(0.2607)
Legor GE -0.2520
(0.7746)
School pri 0.0171
(0.0071)
Pop ruralp -0.0091
(0.0077)
Tele100 0.0175
(0.0104)
R2 0.59
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ Index of financial inclusion is computed from the following indicator of financial inclusion:
Account at a formal financial institution, (% age 15+).
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Table 3.4: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
index of financial inclusion for saved at a formal financial institution, country-level.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit -0.0439 -0.0430 -0.0398
(0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0112)
Lgdppc 0.5104
(0.3086)
Legor UK 0.7247
(0.2566)
Legor SO -0.1392
(0.2566)
Legor GE 0.1615
(0.8437)
School pri 0.0053
(0.0070)
Pop ruralp -0.0016
(0.0076)
Tele100 0.0085
(0.0103)
R2 0.54
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ Index of financial inclusion is computed from the following indicator of financial inclusion:
Saved at a financial institution in the past year, (% age 15+).
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Table 3.5: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
composite index of financial inclusion, rural-sector.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit -0.0095 -0.0093 -0.0092
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Lgdppc 0.5806
(0.2928)
Legor UK 0.7095
(0.2435)
Legor SO -0.0494
(0.2435)
Legor GE -0.1766
(0.8006)
School pri 0.0083
(0.0066)
Pop ruralp -0.0028
(0.0072)
Tele100 0.0118
(0.0097)
R2 0.49
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ The composite index of financial inclusion is computed from the following two indicators of financial
inclusion: 1) Account at a formal financial institution, rural (% age 15+), and 2) Saved at a financial
institution in the past year, rural (% age 15+).
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Table 3.6: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
index of financial inclusion for account at a formal financial institution, rural-sector.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit -0.0091 -0.0087 -0.0086
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Lgdppc 0.8070
(0.3240)
Legor UK 0.6989
(0.2695)
Legor SO 0.2746
(0.2694)
Legor GE -0.1514
(0.8858)
School pri 0.0179
(0.0074)
Pop ruralp -0.0059
(0.0080)
Tele100 0.0179
(0.0108)
R2 0.58
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ Index of financial inclusion is computed from the following indicator of financial inclusion:
Account at a financial institution in the past year, rural (% age 15+).
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Table 3.7: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
index of financial inclusion for saved at a formal financial institution, rural-sector.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit -0.0370 -0.0358 -0.0308
(0.0096) (0.0093) (0.0092)
Lgdppc 0.5617
(0.3214)
Legor UK 0.8201
(0.2673)
Legor SO -0.1072
(0.2673)
Legor GE 0.0905
(0.8787)
School pri 0.0059
(0.0073)
Pop ruralp -0.0008
(0.0079)
Tele100 0.0072
(0.0107)
R2 0.51
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ Index of financial inclusion is computed from the following indicator of financial inclusion:
Saved at a financial institution in the past year, rural (% age 15+).
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Table 3.8: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
composite index of financial inclusion, urban-sector.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit -0.0371 -0.0265 0.0118
(0.0645) (0.0533) (0.0752)
Lgdppc 0.4437
(0.2843)
Legor UK 0.6115
(0.2364)
Legor SO -0.0419
(0.2364)
Legor GE -0.0134
(0.7772)
School pri 0.0070
(0.0065)
Pop ruralp -0.0070
(0.0071)
Tele100 0.0140
(0.0095)
R2 0.43
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ The composite index of financial inclusion is computed from the following two indicators of financial
inclusion: 1) Account at a formal financial institution, urban (% age 15+), and 2) Saved at a financial
institution in the past year, urban (% age 15+).
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Table 3.9: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
index of financial inclusion for account at a formal financial institution, urban-sector.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit 0.0231 0.0384 0.0481
(0.0566) (0.0660) (0.0911)
Lgdppc 0.5749
(0.2786)
Legor UK 0.5817
(0.2317)
Legor SO 0.1153
(0.2316)
Legor GE -0.2581
(0.7616)
School pri 0.0086
(0.0064)
Pop ruralp -0.0001
(0.0067)
Tele100 0.0241
(0.0093)
R2 0.58
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ Index of financial inclusion is computed from the following indicator of financial inclusion:
Account at a financial institution in the past year, urban (% age 15+).
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Table 3.10: Semiparametric Partially Linear Model estimates. Dependent Variable is the
index of financial inclusion for saved at a formal financial institution, urban-sector.∗
Parametric Nonparametric
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3
Remit -0.0206 -0.0169 -0.0144
(0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0200)
Lgdppc 0.4412
(0.3807)
Legor UK 0.5353
(0.2891)
Legor SO -0.3137
(0.2884)
Legor GE 0.0871
(1.0160)
School pri 0.0073
(0.0083)
Pop ruralp 0.0009
(0.0085)
Tele100 0.0094
(0.0123)
R2 0.32
n 81
Note 1: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note 2: Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the nonparametric local linear quartile estimates for remittances.
∗ Index of financial inclusion is computed from the following indicator of financial inclusion:
Saved at a financial institution in the past year, urban (% age 15+).
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Table 3.11: Remittances and financial inclusion: OLS estimates from linear parametric
models (country-level).
Dependent variable: The index of financial inclusion at country-levelF
Variable Model-I Model-II Model-III
Remit -0.0129 -0.0082 -0.0342∗∗∗
(-1.213) (-0.705) (-2.723)
Lgdppc 0.6542∗∗ 0.8885∗∗∗ 0.5634∗
(2.294) (2.848) (1.67)
Legor UK 0.6252∗∗∗ 0.6459∗∗∗ 0.7021∗∗∗
(2.865) (2.75) (2.753)
Legor SO 0.1268 0.1067 -0.3463
(-0.588) (0.453) (-1.353)
Legor GE -0.0981 -0.3421 0.0241
(-0.126) (0.6895) (0.026)
School pri 0.0096 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0094
(1.51) (2.746) (1.236)
Pop ruralp -0.0017 -0.0039 -0.0016
(-0.267) (-0.54) (-0.207)
Tele100 0.0135 0.0206∗∗ 0.011
(1.433) (2.002) (0.984)
Constant -3.8289∗∗∗ -5.539∗∗∗ -3.533∗∗
(-3.046) (-4.029) (-2.366)
Observations 81 81 81
R2 0.497 0.604 0.452
Note 1: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Note 2. Significance levels denoted as ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10.
F Dependent variable for Model I is the composite index (computed from indicators in models II
and III) of financial inclusion at country-level; for Model II, it is the computed index of financial
inclusion for indicator- account at a formal financial institution (% age 15+); and for Model III,
it is the computed index of financial inclusion for indicator- saved at a formal financial institution
(% age 15+).
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Table 3.12: Remittances and financial inclusion: OLS estimates from linear parametric
models (rural-sector).
Dependent variable: The index of financial inclusion for rural-sectorF
Variable Model-I Model-II Model-III
Remit -0.0132 -0.0082 -0.0344∗∗∗
(-1.205) (-0.682) (-2.674)
Lgdppc 0.6743∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.605∗
(2.282) (2.948) (1.746)
Legor UK 0.6628∗∗∗ 0.6633∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(2.98) (2.723) (2.927)
Legor SO -0.0832 0.1223 -0.299
(-0.373) (0.501) (-1.145)
Legor GE -0.275 -0.643 -0.079
(-0.341) (-0.727) (-0.084)
School pri 0.0104 0.02∗∗∗ 0.0091
(1.571) (2.743) (1.178)
Pop ruralp -0.001 -0.0016 -0.0004
(-0.134) (-0.222) (-0.048)
Tele100 0.014 0.021∗ 0.01
(1.43) (1.984) (0.859)
Constant -4.134∗∗∗ -6.035∗∗∗ -3.813∗∗
(-3.175) (-4.232) (-2.498)
Observations 81 81 81
R2 0.486 0.589 0.439
Note 1: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Note 2. Significance levels denoted as ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10.
F Dependent variable for Model I is the composite index (computed from indicators in models II
and III) of financial inclusion at rural-sector; for Model II, it is the computed index of financial
inclusion for indicator- account at a formal financial institution, rural (% age 15+); and for Model III,
it is the computed index of financial inclusion for indicator- saved at a formal financial institution, rural
(% age 15+).
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Table 3.13: Remittances and financial inclusion: OLS estimates from linear parametric
models (urban-sector).
Dependent variable: The index of financial inclusion for urban-sectorF
Variable Model-I Model-II Model-III
Remit -0.0106 -0.0132 -0.0071
(-0.995) (-1.271) (-0.503)
Lgdppc 0.579∗∗ 0.719∗∗ 0.5452
(2.018) (2.577) (1.431)
Legor UK 0.540∗∗ 0.524∗∗ 0.5454∗
(2.501) (2.494) (1.902)
Legor SO -0.172 0.0164 -0.5007∗
(-0.794) (0.078) (-1.74)
Legor GE -0.111 -0.345 -0.042
(-0.142) (-0.453) (-0.04)
School pri 0.01 0.011∗ 0.012
(1.54) (1.796) (1.39)
Pop ruralp 0.0023 0.004 0.0025
(0.354) (0.638) (0.295)
Tele100 0.016∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.015
(1.713) (2.868) (1.18)
Constant -3.683∗∗∗ -4.368∗∗∗ -3.895∗∗
(-2.914) (-3.553) (-2.32)
Observations 81 81 81
R2 0.431 0.581 0.295
Note 1: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Note 2. Significance levels denoted as ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10.
F Dependent variable for Model I is the composite index (computed from indicators in models II
and III) of financial inclusion at urban-sector; for Model II, it is the computed index of financial
inclusion for indicator- account at a formal financial institution, urban (% age 15+); and for Model III,
it is the computed index of financial inclusion for indicator- saved at a formal financial institution, urban
(% age 15+).
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Table 3.14: Remittances (in first-differences) and financial inclusion: OLS estimates from
linear parametric models (country-level).
Dependent variable: The index of financial inclusion at country-levelF
Variable Model-I Model-II Model-III
d(Remit) -0.0189∗∗∗ -0.0150∗ -0.0324∗∗∗
(-2.7315) (-1.9549) (-3.9701)
Lgdppc 0.7035∗∗ 0.9165∗∗∗ 0.7315∗∗
(2.6349) (3.0993) (2.3322)
Legor UK 0.4564∗∗ 0.5424∗∗ 0.3948
(2.1352) (2.2911) (1.5724)
Legor SO -0.1742 0.0930 -0.4803∗
(-0.8457) (0.4076) (-1.9849)
Legor GE -0.0644 -0.3043 0.0531
(-0.0854) (-0.3645) (0.0599)
School pri 0.0081 0.0184∗∗∗ 0.0075
(1.3117) (2.6611) (1.0272)
Pop ruralp 0.0006 -0.0025 0.0030
(0.1078) (-0.3569) (0.4090)
Tele100 0.0135 0.0204∗∗ 0.0108
(1.4835) (2.0312) (1.0116)
Constant -3.9707∗∗∗ -5.6337∗∗∗ -4.1818∗∗∗
(-3.3925) (-4.3456) (-3.0410)
Observations 80 80 80
Adjusted R2 0.479 0.581 0.447
Note 1: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Note 2. Significance levels denoted as ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10.
F Dependent variable for Model I is the composite index (computed from indicators in models II
and III) of financial inclusion at country-level; for Model II, it is the computed index of financial
inclusion for indicator- account at a formal financial institution (% age 15+); and for Model III,
it is the computed index of financial inclusion for indicator- saved at a formal financial institution
(% age 15+).
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Table 3.15: Remittances (in first-differences) and financial inclusion: OLS estimates from
linear parametric models (rural-sector).
Dependent variable: The index of financial inclusion for rural-sectorF
Variable Model-I Model-II Model-III
d(Remit) -0.0195∗∗∗ -0.0155∗ -0.0332∗∗∗
(-2.7170) (-1.9453) (-3.9871)
Lgdppc 0.7240∗∗ 0.9804∗∗∗ 0.7701∗∗
(2.6145) (3.1902) (2.4065)
Legor UK 0.4927∗∗ 0.5516∗∗ 0.4374∗
(2.2226) (2.2422) (1.7074)
Legor SO -0.1378 0.1042 -0.4460∗
(-0.6452) (0.4398) (-1.8066)
Legor GE -0.2426 -0.6053 -0.0530
(-0.3104) (-0.6978) (-0.0587)
School pri 0.0087 0.0188∗∗ 0.0068
(1.3446) (2.6287) (0.9126)
Pop ruralp 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0048
(0.2705) (-0.0162) (0.6251)
Tele100 0.0140 0.0207∗ 0.0097
(1.4866) (1.9775) (0.8968)
Constant -4.2612∗∗∗ -6.1083∗∗∗ -4.4167∗∗∗
(-3.5100) (-4.5339) (-3.1480)
Observations 81 81 81
Adjusted R2 0.465 0.562 0.433
Note 1: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Note 2. Significance levels denoted as ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10.
F Dependent variable for Model I is the composite index (computed from indicators in models II
and III) of financial inclusion at rural-sector; for Model II, it is the computed index of financial
inclusion for indicator- account at a formal financial institution, rural (% age 15+); and for Model III,
it is the computed index of financial inclusion for indicator- saved at a formal financial institution, rural
(% age 15+).
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Table 3.16: Remittances (in first-differences) and financial inclusion: OLS estimates from
linear parametric models (urban-sector).
Dependent variable: The index of financial inclusion for urban-sectorF
Variable Model-I Model-II Model-III
d(Remit) -0.0175∗∗ -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗
(-2.5156) (-2.6558) (-2.1169)
Lgdppc 0.6174∗∗ 0.7753∗∗∗ 0.5551
(2.2987) (2.9767) (1.5424)
Legor UK 0.4081∗ 0.3877∗ 0.4060
(1.8979) (1.8593) (1.4092)
Legor SO -0.1998 -0.0168 -0.5157∗
(-0.9641) (-0.0836) (-1.8575)
Legor GE -0.0723 -0.3089 0.0111
(-0.0954) (-0.4202) (0.0109)
School pri 0.0088 0.0104∗ 0.0102
(1.4039) (1.7078) (1.2168)
Pop ruralp 0.0041 0.0058 0.0045
(0.6450) (0.9397) (0.5304)
Tele100 0.0161∗ 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0148
(1.7605) (2.9515) (1.212)
Constant -3.8053∗∗∗ -4.5861∗∗∗ -3.8583∗∗
(-3.2315) (-4.0163) (-2.4455)
Observations 80 80 80
Adjusted R2 0.415 0.571 0.263
Note 1: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Note 2. Significance levels denoted as ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10.
F Dependent variable for Model I is the composite index (computed from indicators in models II
and III) of financial inclusion at urban-sector; for Model II, it is the computed index of financial
inclusion for indicator- account at a formal financial institution, urban (% age 15+); and for Model III,
it is the computed index of financial inclusion for indicator- saved at a formal financial institution, urban
(% age 15+).
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Chapter 4
Do Remittances Enhance the Ease of
Starting a Business?∗
4.1 Introduction
There is a growing body of literature that documents a positive linkage between remittances
and entrepreneurship in the recipient countries. Receipts from remittances are likely to
influence a potential entrepreneur′s decision to start a business. Empirical research on re-
mittances find the evidence that remittances are used to finance start-up and operating costs
for local businesses. As a source of international capital, remittances are found to promote
business ownership and increase investment in new businesses. Some case studies indicate
that the inflow of remittances can lead to a significantly higher level of investment in existing
microenterprises.
Despite the relevance of remittances in shaping entrepreneurial activities in recipient
countries, the literature on remittances has paid no attention to the link between these
financial transfers and the ease of starting a business. The term ‘red tape’ is commonly used
∗I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Feng Yao, for his guidance throughout this research work. I
am thankful to Prof. Stratford Douglas, Prof. Arabinda Basistha, Prof. Andrew Young, and Prof. Philip
Michelbach for their constructive comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are mine.
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in business arena to refer to an excessive bureaucracy or adherence to rules and formalities,
especially in public business. For 2014, for instance, the time required to start a business
in the U. S. is six days. This is longer than in Canada and France, along with eight other
countries, where it takes five days. This signifies the fact that red tape plays a critical role
to hold back small businesses and entrepreneurs within an economy.
Canare et al. (2015) argue that the easier it is to establish and run a business, the more
investors will be encouraged to invest, and thus more employment is generated. They assert
that a good business environment also promotes competition and encourages innovation and
expansion. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that exclusively examines the
relationship between remittances and the institutional framework that affects entrepreneur-
ship. Mundaca (2008) opines that much work remains to be done in analyzing the economic
effects of remittances and their interaction with business and financial sectors. Our goal is to
bridge this gap by considering the effects of remittances within a framework of financial in-
stitutions and business regulations that deals with small and medium-sized businesses. This
idea is consistent with the study of causality between remittances and institutional quality
that has recently been highlighted in the remittances literature.
For an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate a business, several official procedures
are commonly required in practice. This process also involves considerable amount of time,
costs associated with such procedures as verifications, pre- and post-registrations, licenses,
permits, and inscriptions for the company and employees with relevant authorities, and
a stipulated amount of capital (Doing Business, WB, 2015). A potential entrepreneur,
therefore, is confronted with such legal, procedural, and regulatory requirements before
starting a business. In the business literature, such an environment is uniquely identified in
terms of a measure called ‘starting a business.’
The ‘starting a business’ is a measure of business regulations and entrepreneurial per-
formance in a country. This variable is numerically expressed in terms of what is called
‘distance to frontier’ score. (Henceforth, DTF score.) A measure of DTF score indicates an
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absolute quality or level of performance of an economy with regards to the ease of starting
a business. The higher is the DTF score, the better is the performance of an economy with
respect to starting a business. A higher DTF score implies a smaller gap for an economy
relative to the best performance, known as the ‘frontier.’ The starting a business indicator,
measured as DTF score, is the response variable in this essay.
Note that starting a business variable expressed as DTF score is not the same as that of
the ease of doing business. A drawback of the ease of doing business ranking is that it can
measure the regulatory performance of economies only relative to the performance of others.
It does not provide information on how the absolute quality of the regulatory environment
is improving over time. Nor does it provide information on how large the gaps are between
economies at a single point of time. The DTF score measure is designed to address both of
these shortcomings. The DTF score illustrates the distance of an economy to the frontier,
and the change in the measure over time shows the extent to which the economy has closed
this gap. The frontier is a score derived from the most efficient practice or highest score
achieved on all set of indicators in the doing business framework. The DTF score measure
benchmarks economies to the frontier in regulatory practice, measuring the absolute distance
to the best performance on each indicator (Doing Business, WB, 2014).
The DTF score representing the starting a business variable, as described above, is com-
posed of indicators including officially required procedures that involve substantial amount
of time and costs. The company law or commercial code of a country mandates a potential
entrepreneur to comply with these and other legal and regulatory requirements to formally
set up and run a business. However, such legal procedures are not rigid in the context of
many developing countries. The process of monitoring and functioning of financial institu-
tions are driven much by either narrow political interests or external monetary and financial
shocks.
Grabel (2008) opines that formal financial institutions in many countries, either low-
or high-income countries, have turned their limited attention away from small businesses
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and toward speculative activities in the era of financial liberalization. In the context of
rising remittances inflows, however, efforts to capture the booming remittances market may
cause formal financial institutions to respond to their smaller customers and local businesses
by simplifying their legal means and procedures. This, in effect, urges the nation′s legal
authorities to ease burdensome regulatory practices and bureaucratic procedures so as to
ensure a greater participation in the formal financial sector. Recently, the initiatives taken
by many governments, international organizations, and banks to increase ‘financial inclusion’
of their population are key examples of such inclusive policy reforms.
Since 2006, the World Bank has been ranking almost 200 countries in terms of their
business environment and the ‘ease of doing business’ in these economies. The rationale
behind this is the importance of a thriving private sector in promoting high and inclusive
growth and development (Canare et al., 2015).
So it is not hard to understand that domestic entrepreneurs require to invest more time
and resources to start a business if the institutional environment that shapes business ac-
tivities is complicated. Studies show that procedural complexities are significant limiting
factors for entrepreneurial growth, in both developing and developed economies. Once the
complexities in number and extent of laws and procedures are simplified to promote financial
inclusiveness, the time and costs associated with complying to these procedures are reduced
all at the same time for an entrepreneur. It is likely that reform measures for lowering the
stipulated amount of start-up capital may also be put into place to support potentially active
but financially weaker entrepreneurs. This can be a fundamental step towards gearing up
local businesses. We, therefore, conjecture that the rise in remittances inflows are likely to
influence the entrepreneurial performance positively in the the recipient countries through
their favorable impacts on financial institutions and business regulations.
We organize this essay as follows. The next section presents a brief literature review on
remittances and entrepreneurship following by section 4.3 describing our empirical approach.
In this section, we provide details of the nature of our response variable and the beta re-
97
gression technique used in the analysis. Section 4.4 develops some insights into interpreting
parameter estimates from beta regression model, and section 4.5 describes the data and
variables. Empirical findings are summarized in section 4.6 and section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
In this section, we briefly review the literature on remittances and their effects on 1) en-
trepreneurial environment and 2) entrepreneurial activities. These surveys will provide some
background for an idea that relates remittances to entrepreneurship, and highlight the sig-
nificance of our study of the relationship between remittances and level of entrepreneurial
performance via their impact on financial institutions and business regulations in remittance-
recipient countries.
Financial institutions often seek to commercialize and offer a wider range of financial
services to their clients. For the last few decades, large and persistent remittances flows
have opened up a scope for lucrative businesses for such institutions. Money transfer is
seen as an opportunity to provide potentially very profitable products which can aid in the
commercialization process. Not only does handling of remittances seem to promise high
returns, but also the opportunities of cross-selling of loans and products such as savings
or overdraft facilities. Financial institutions have emphasized the need to integrate low-
income remittance receivers with broader financial services. They are putting extra efforts
to change their current ‘mode’ of operation to efficient services that are accessible to grass
roots, safe and reliable, timely, client and service oriented, and moderately priced. There is
a high potential for capturing a market share of an underserviced remittances market. Many
financial institutions, however, are not in position to take advantage of this opportunity.
This is due, in particular, to their limited institutional and system capacities, procedural
complexities, limited networks of service outlets, and links to international networks (Sander,
2003).
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A remittance-receiving country′s state of financial development may cause remittance
receipts to have an important influence on the domestic entrepreneurial performance. When
a country′s domestic financial system is poorly developed, a large number of households
are rationed out of formal credit markets, because the cost of providing credit to them is
prohibitively high (Chami et al., 2008). These households are therefore unable to initiate
business endeavors.
A significant inflow of remittances, therefore, can contribute to both sides of the aisle. One
the one hand, attractive remittances market help prosper the commercialization of financial
institutions, thereby forcing them to simplify their rigid legal and bureaucratic procedures.
On the other hand, remittances do not only add to the resource base of recipient households
and potential entrepreneurs, these transfers also help accumulate assets and collateral in
several forms. This is likely to enable creditworthiness of otherwise opaque entrepreneurs.
So remittances can back-up potential entrepreneurs to obtain loans from formal financial
institutions, thereby empowering them to undertake new and profitable business projects.
Remittances do not only moderate the decline of households′ consumption during re-
cessions because of their counter-cyclicality, they also are used to finance the start-up and
operating costs of microenterprises that bolster households′ income during economic down-
turns (Shapiro and Mandelman, 2014; Yang, 2005). Lucas (1987) and Rozelle et al. (1999)
analyze the growth potential of remittances in a context of capital market imperfections.
They find that remittances allow households at the middle-to-bottom end of the wealth
distribution to accumulate productive assets and to have access to self-employment and
entrepreneurship.
It is argued that capital investment can occur only when the channeling of remittances
to such investment is facilitated by financial intermediaries that are able to accept deposits
and make them available for lending to agents with investment needs. Consequently, an
economy will experience a higher increase in the growth rate if remittances are very large
relative to the average ‘per entrepreneur’ capital stock. If financial markets develop properly,
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it removes financing constraints on both firms′ and individuals′ development. Remittances
might be then viewed as financial flows in search of good investment objects and good
financial institutions that together can meet the investment needs of households with family
members living abroad (Mundaca, 2008).
As developing economies are characterized by less efficient credit markets, a high level of
income inequality and poorly developed capital markets are the biggest concerns for these
countries. Therefore, individuals possessing little wealth must forgo potentially profitable
investment opportunities (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001). Studies show that the formation
of new businesses as well as the profitability of the existing businesses appear to be affected
by financial constraints. Business start-ups are particularly associated with the wealth of
potential entrepreneurs if financial constraints limit the scope of entrepreneurial activities.
If financial constraints are not important, potential entrepreneurs might decide to start a
business based on its expected risk and profitability situations. Also, they can manage out-
side financing to start the project. On the other hand, if financial constraints are important,
however, outside financing may be unavailable or insufficient. This will create a link between
the wealth of the potential entrepreneur and the decision to start a business (Paulson and
Townsend, 2004).
Many researchers have shown that access to capital is an important factor in en-
treprenurial development. Using a survey of small firms in Mexico, Woodruff and Zenteno
(2001) study the impact of remittances on investment level of Mexican microenterprises.
They find the evidence that access to remittance capital does not only lead to higher level
of investment, but it also significantly affects the decision to start an enterprise. They argue
that savings of returning migrants may be an important source of startup capital for microen-
terpirses. Their findings show that almost 25% of the capital invested in microenterprises
comes from remitted funds. In a similar study, Dustmann and Kirchamp (2001) employ
household level survey data for Turkish migrants to study what activities migrants choose
after a return. They show that more than 50% of the returning migrants are economically
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active after return, and most of them engage in entrepreneurial activities using money saved
while working abroad.
By revealing the complementary role of domestic institutions on entrepreneurship, Ashby
and Seck (2012) find that remittances lead to greater entrepreneurial endeavors, but this im-
pact is higher in countries with high quality of institutions than in countries with lower
quality institutions. They employ unbalanced panel data of more than 100 countries and use
the number of newly registered businesses as their measure of entrepreneurship. They argue
that remittances support economic development of the low and middle income countries
conditional on whether these countries carry out reforms to improve economic and political
institutions. Piracha and Saraogi (2011) also support above claim by stating that govern-
ments of the remittance recipient countries need to create cohesive policies as an integral
part of the development plan to help maximize the benefits of inflow of remittances.
There are, however, some empirical studies that do not find any favorable impact of re-
mittances on either new business ownership or level of investment. Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo (2006) use household survey data to explore the importance of these monetary inflows
in promoting household business ownership in Dominican Republic. Their findings indicate
that household remittances receipt lower the households′ likelihood of business ownership.
They argue that such results may arise due to increase in reservation wages driven by re-
mittances, increase in consumption, or rise in household expenditure on housing, education,
and healthcare. Similarly, Chami et al. (2003) employ panel data analysis consisting of 113
countries to show that remittances do not appear to be a significant source of capital for
economic development. They claim that because of asymmetric information and economic
uncertainty, remittances may create moral hazard problem that can be severe enough to
retard economic activities.
Regarding the role of financial constraints in shaping the patterns of entrepreneurship,
Paulson and Townshed (2004) use household level survey data from rural and semi-urban
Thailand to examine whether wealthier households are more likely to start businesses. They
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provide the evidence that households who eventually start businesses have been accumu-
lating wealth more quickly than households who do not start businesses prior to starting
a business- as though they were saving in an effort to overcome an inability to borrow to
finance business start-up costs- also underscores the importance of financial constraints.
Paulson and Townshed′s observation highlight the importance of remittances inflows in the
context of developing countries in loosening credit market constraints, thereby facilitating
the business endeavor undertaken by potential entrepreneurs.
4.3 Empirical methodology
As mentioned earlier, our dependent variable representing ‘starting a business’ activities
across countries is a ‘distance to frontier’ (DTF) score. The DTF score is a continuous
variable and is strictly restricted. By construction, it holds values in the standard unit (open)
interval: (DTF ∈ (0, 1)). How should one perform a regression analysis in such a situation?
One possible choice is to transform the response variable as y˜ = log( y
1−y ) so that y˜ assumes
values in the real line and then apply a standard linear regression analysis. However, this
approach creates difficulties in interpreting the parameters as they are interpretable in terms
of the mean of y˜, and not in terms of the mean of y. Moreover, regressions involving data
from the unit interval are typically heteroskedastic. It means they display more variation
around the mean and less variation as we approach the lower and upper limits of the standard
unit interval. Also, the data restricted to the unit interval such as this exhibits asymmetry,
and hence inference based on the assumption of normal distribution can be misleading. In
cases such as this, one may appropriately consider the beta distribution as an appropriate
distribution for the response variable. As this method resolves the issues emanating from
heterogeneity across observations and from lack of normality in model errors, we pool the data
and apply the beta regression model to study the impact of remittances on entrepreneurial
environment across countries.
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Unlike the case of normally distributed random variable where mean and variance are
independent, a beta-distribution involves the variance that can be expressed as a function of
the mean. So if a researcher is interested not only in how a covariate influences the expected
value of the function, but also the variance, she can appropriately use beta distribution to
model the heteroskedasticity. The beta distribution is a continuous probability distribution
defined over the unit interval with the beta density expressed as:
f(y|α, β) = Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
yα−1(1− y)β−1; 0 < y < 1. (4.1)
Where α, β > 0; Γ() denotes the gamma function. In their particular parameterization,
Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) formulates the above beta density in the following form:
f(y;µ, φ) =
Γ(µ)
Γ(µφ)Γ((1− µ)φ)y
µφ−1(1− y)(1−µ)φ−1; 0 < y < 1. (4.2)
with 0¡µ < 1, and φ > 0, where µ and φ are expressed as follows:
µ =
α
α + β
and φ = α + β. (4.3)
The beta-distributed response variable, y, is expressed as y ∼ B(µ, φ), such that
E(y) = µ; and V ar(y) =
µ(1− µ)
(1 + φ)
. (4.4)
Note that the variance is the function of the mean and the parameter, φ. The parameter
φ fulfills the definition of a precision parameter because, for fixed µ, the greater the value
of φ, the smaller the variance of the dependent variable. The regression parameters are
interpretable in terms of the mean of y. In beta regression models, the mean parameter
µ ∈ (0, 1) of the beta distribution is expressed as a function of covariates. We will see below
that g(µi) = (x
T
i β) = ηi (a linear predictor); and so µi = g
−1(xTi β), implying that µi is a
function of β, the vector of regression parameters.
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Let y1, . . . , yn be a random sample representing the DTF scores for starting a business
across countries such that yi ∼ B(µi, φ); i = 1, . . . , n. Then, to map the linear predictor into
the space of observed values on the unit interval, the beta regression model analyzed in this
paper using the logit link function is defined as the following:
logitg(µi) = log(
µi
1− µi ) = x
T
i β = ηi. (4.5)
Where xi = (xi1, . . . , xik)
T is a k × 1 vector of explanatory variables or regressors including
remittances (see Section 4), β = (β1, . . . , βk)
T is a k × 1 vector of unknown regression
coefficients, and k < n. From equation (4.5), we can write
log(
µi
1− µi ) = β1xi1 + · · ·+ βkxik = ηi. (4.6)
In general, xi1 = 1 for all i so that the model has an intercept. The main motivation for
applying a link function to the regression structure is such that both sides of the regression
equation assume values in the real line. Moreover, an appropriate choice of the link function
may lead to the best fit of the model. From equations (4.4) and (4.5), we obtain
V ar(yi) =
µi(1− µi)
(1 + φ)
=
g−1(xTi β)[1− g−1(xTi β)]
1 + φ
.
This illustrates that the variance of y is a function of µ. Therefore, the parameterization
based on Ferrari and Cribari-Neto(2004) makes the model inherently heteroskedastic. The
log-likelihood function is `(β, φ) =
n∑
i=1
`i(µi, φ), where
`i(µi, φ) = logΓ(φ)− logΓ(µiφ)− logΓ((1−µi)φ)+(µiφ−1)logyi+{(1−µi)φ−1}log(1−yi).
(4.7)
As we can see from above, µi = g
−1(xTi β), implying that µi is a function of β, the vector
of regression parameters. The parameters of the model are estimated by the method of
maximum likelihood (ML).
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4.4 Interpretation of parameter estimates
How do we interpret the parameter estimates from the beta regression model? In fact,
interpretation of parameter estimates in the beta regression model (when logit link is used)is
equivalent to a logistic regression in which exponentiated coefficients can be interpreted in
terms of odds ratio. By applying the exponential function to both sides in equation (4.6),
we obtain
exp(log(
µi
1− µi )) = exp(β1xi1 + · · ·+ βkxik).
From this expression, the ratio of expected value of DTF score to that of difference to the
perfect DTF score can be written as
µ
i
1− µi = exp(β1xi1 + · · ·+ βkxik). (4.8)
Where µi is the expected value of DTF (Distance to Frontier) score under initial covariates.
Equation (4.8) can be described as the ratio of convergence of an economy toward the frontier
relative to its divergence from the frontier or perfect performance. Now, let us assume that
µ∗i be the expected value of DTF score if we increase xk by one unit to the right-hand side
in (4.8), holding all other regressors unchanged. Under this scenario, the above ratio can be
written as
µ∗i
1− µ∗i
= exp(β1xi1 + · · ·+ βk(xik + 1)). (4.9)
Now, dividing equation (4.9) by that of equation (4.8), we obtain the resulting ratio as
µ∗i
1−µ∗i
µi
1−µi
=
exp(β1xi1 + · · ·+ βk(xik + 1))
exp(β1xi1 + · · ·+ βkxik) . (4.10)
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By simplification,
µ∗i
1−µ∗i
µi
1−µi
= exp(βk). (4.11)
The coefficient βk in equation (4.11) expresses itself as the log of two ratios each representing
the convergence of an economy toward the frontier relative to its divergence from the frontier
or perfect performance. It is independent of any particular observation, that is, it does not
depend on the particular value of the covariates. The resulting ratio in equation (4.11)
quantifies the mean efficiency level by which the remittance-recipient economy is driven up
toward the frontier or lowered down from it when the covariate xk is increased by one unit
relative to the initial values of all the covariates.
Now, let us consider an example of how we can interpret a coefficient estimate from
the beta regression model. Assume that the parameter βk is associated with remittances in
our beta regression model of entrepreneurial environment given by equation (4.5) such that
βk=0.2109, then, e
(0.2109) ≈ 1.235. So we obtain, from equation (4.11),
µ∗i
1−µ∗i
µi
1−µi
= 1.235 =
2.47
2
=
b
a
. (4.12)
By simplification, µi =
a
1+a
= 0.66 and µ∗i =
b
1+b
= 0.71.
This is interpreted as follows: “a unit increase in remittances per capita is found to raise
the expected efficiency level of the recipient economy from 0.66 to 0.71 in terms of the DTF of
starting a business.” This implies that the convergence of the remittance-recipient economy
is driven up toward the frontier of starting a business from an expected efficiency level of 0.66
to the expected efficiency level of 0.71 on average if the inflow of remittances is increased
by one unit relative to the initial value of all covariates. As the frontier represents the
perfect level of performance, a positive coefficient with remittances implies that the inflow
of remittances leads the economy toward higher level of performance in terms of starting a
business.
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4.5 Data and variables
The data for this analysis come from the following sources: World Development Indicators
(WDI), Doing Business Database of World Bank Group, Heritage Foundation, and Center
for International Development at Harvard University (CID). Table 4.1 in Appendix presents
a summary descriptive statistics of all the variables employed in this study. Our dependent
variable (Distance to Frontier, DTF ∈ (0, 1)) is a measure of the level of business environ-
ment in a country that quantifies the ease of “starting a business”. It is computed by using
four component indicators of starting a business, viz., minimum capital requirement (% of
income per capita), number of required procedures, cost to complete each procedure (% of
income per capita), and time required to complete each procedure (calendar days).
Before constructing the DTF score, individual indicator scores are normalized to a com-
mon unit by computing a component indicator, di, for a given component, by the following
formula.
di =
Mi − yi
Mi −mi ; 0 ≤ di ≤ 1. (4.13)
Where, i = 1, 2, 3, 4; Mi =maximum value for component i; mi =minimum value for compo-
nent i; yi =actual value of component i.
To mitigate the effects of outliers in the rescaled data, the maximum is defined as the
95th percentile of the pooled data for all economies and all years for each indicator. The
similar procedure is applied to define the minimum performance. In fact, this approach of
computing DTF score makes it asymptote to the extreme values 0 and 1. The composite
DTF score is a simple average of DTF scores for these four indicators.
The variable of interest is remittances per capita (in thousands unit) which is obtained
by dividing total absolute size of remittances by total population. Remittances are defined
as the sum of worker′s remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant′s transfers.
The control variables are chosen by referring to standard entrepreneurship literature. They
include logarithm of real GDP per capita, level of education (school enrollment, secondary(%
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gross)), a measure of institutional quality (business freedom index), urbanization (urban
population, % of total), degree of economic openness (exports, % of GDP), binary variables
for legal origins, and religion variables (% of population). Note that business freedom index
is an overall indicator of the efficiency of government regulation of business that includes
even the closing aspects of a business. This index, though correlated with the DTF score of
ease of starting a business, is a much broader concept.
The period of analysis covers 2004-2012. The dataset form an unbalanced panel con-
sisting of 133 countries based on the availability of data. The total number of country-year
observations is 849. The dataset is available from the author upon request.
4.6 Empirical findings
Before presenting the estimation results, we check on the nature of the data whether the
model assumes homoskedasticity. We perform studentized Breusch-Pagan (1979) test by run-
ning Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. By rejecting the null hypothesis with the test,
the model exhibits heteroskedasticity. The use of beta regression model with logit link func-
tion, therefore, can contribute to the best fit of the model by addressing heteroskedasticity
as well as the asymmetry of the model residuals.
Table 4.1 (see Appendix) presents the major results of our analyses. Column 2 shows the
estimates from pooled model. This provides some indication about the direction of impacts
of our regressors on the dependent variable. As a first impression, remittances appear to
have a positive impact on starting a business. The pooled model, however, may violate
the assumption of homogeneity. To account for the heterogeneity in the data, we than
estimate a random-effects model along with time-fixed effects controlled. A random-effects
model allows the country-specific effects to be random and so the across country variation
in the explanatory variables play important role to explain variation in the expected value
of the dependent variable. We are not employing a fixed-effects model because some of the
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explanatory variables are time invariant.
The parameter estimates from random-effects model are presented in column 3. The
coefficient estimate with remittances appears with a positive sign and is statistically signifi-
cant at 5% level. Before resorting to beta regression, we want to emphasize the result that
the conventional panel estimation technique indicates a favorable impact of remittances on
institutional framework in the recipient country. The results also provide supports for the
findings in the literature that the level of education and better institutional quality (business
freedom as a proxy here) have a positive impact on entrepreneurial performance of a country.
Also, the estimates with urbanization and openness are negative, providing the evidence that
in a situation of increasing competition and complexities, starting a new business climate
turns out to be harder and becomes very challenging.
As discussed above, with the assumption that our response variable follow beta-
distribution, we use the beta regression model to alleviate the twin problems arising from
violations of homoskedasticity and normality of model errors. Column 4 in Table 4.1 shows
parameter estimates from the beta regression model with legal dummy variables included as
a part of explanatory variables. We find that the estimate with remittances bears a posi-
tive sign and is statistically significant. Clearly, this result reinforces our findings from the
pooled and panel estimation that inflow of remittances exhibits a strong positive relationship
with entrepreneurial performance in the recipient country measured in terms of starting a
business.
Furthermore, as we described in Section 4.4, with the coefficient estimate equal to 0.2109
(see Beta (Model I), Table 4.1) associated with remittance variable, the resulting ratio is
computed as exp(0.2109) ≈ 1.235. Consequently, from equations (4.11) and (4.12), µi = 0.66
and µ∗i = 0.71. Hence, the results imply that the convergence of the remittance-recipient
economy is driven up toward the frontier of starting a business from an expected efficiency
level of 0.66 to the expected efficiency level of 0.71 on average if the inflow of remittances is
increased by one unit relative to the initial value of all covariates. As the frontier represents
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the perfect level of performance, the positive coefficient implies that the inflow of remittances
leads the economy toward higher level of entrepreneurial performance expressed in terms of
starting a business, thereby filling the gap between this economy with that of the economy of
the best performance. This positive impact is found to be both statistically significant as well
as economically meaningful. Notice that the estimates with other explanatory variables in the
model are entirely consistent with the findings in business and entrepreneurship literature.
Finally, we replace the legal dummy variables with religion variables as a part of explanatory
variables to account for the impact of cultural practices on financial institutions and business
environment. These results are presented in column 5 (see Beta (Model II), Table 4.1). The
findings from this specification are all consistent with that of beta specification in Model I.
We now assess the robustness of our results by using the length of time necessary to
formally set-up and run a domestic, small or medium-sized business as a dependent variable
in our regression model. Basically, the length of time required to start a business is considered
a crucial indicator of overall business environment in a country. This indicator shows the
number of calendar days needed to complete the procedures to legally operate a business.
The World Bank′s database lists 189 countries in terms of the time required to start a
business. For 2014, in first place is New Zealand, with one day. In France and Canada,
along with eight other countries, it takes five days. Also, South Korea, along with six other
countries, is listed as four days. The United States, with 12 other countries, is listed as six
days (Washington Post, May 2015). This scenario illustrates the idea how ‘red tape’ may
hold back small businesses and entrepreneurs even in the context of industrialized economies.
Table 4.2 presents the robustness results. Columns 2 and 3 contain parameter estimates
from pooled OLS models, first with religion variables as a part of explanatory variables
and then with legal dummies. We find a positive estimate for the coefficient associated
with remittances. Now we estimate fixed-effects panel models with robust standard errors.
Column 4 shows the resulting estimates with religion variables included. These results
reinforce our earlier findings by showing that inflow of remittances significantly reduces the
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time required to start a business. Notice that the size of coefficient estimate with remittances
is bigger in absolute term in this model of ‘time’ in comparison to the previous models of
‘ease’ of starting a business. The outcomes are similar once we replace religion variables with
legal origin variables. We find, as expected, better education and greater business freedom
are found to be negatively associated with the length of time required to start a business.
Similarly, as discussed above, higher level of national income and economic liberalization do
not guarantee an ease of starting a business and may not facilitate the reduction of time
required to launch a business. This argument is supported by parameter estimates associated
with GDP per capita and economic openness that appear with a positive sign, which are not
statistically significant, however.
4.7 Concluding remarks
In this essay, we investigated whether remittances enhance the level of entrepreneurial per-
formance in the recipient countries through the ease of starting a business. Specific to our
response variable, Distance to Frontier (DTF ∈ (0, 1)), that measures absolute quality or
level of performance of an economy with regards to starting a business, we analyzed panel
data by focusing on beta regression model. The results provide the evidence that remittances
can significantly improve entrepreneurial performance in the recipient economy through their
favorable impact on financial institutions and business regulations. Our findings show that
inflows of remittances are conductive to doing business in terms of the ‘ease’ and ‘time’ of
starting a business. The results suggest that international money transfers generate posi-
tive incentives for both suppliers and demanders of financial services. Such incentives lead
to attractive investment climate and thriving small and medium-sized businesses. Though
remittances are non-market private transfers, they are useful resources to broaden the scope
of mainstream financial system, thereby contributing to the goal of inclusive development in
the recipient countries.
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4.9 Appendix
Table 4.1: Remittances and starting a business: Pooled OLS, Random-effects (RE), and
Beta (ML) estimates.
Dependent variable: starting a business
Variable Pooled OLS Random-effects† Beta (Model I) Beta (Model II)
Remittances 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.1383∗∗ 0.2109∗∗∗ 0.1998∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0560) (0.0802) (0.0838)
Log GDP per-capita 0.0143 0.0106 0.1321∗ 0.0087
(0.0141) (0.0404) (0.0725) (0.0735)
Education 0.0014∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0098∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Bussiness freedom 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Urbanization -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Openness -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0019∗∗ -0.0003
(0.00015) (0.0004) (0.00087) (0.00086)
Legal origin (Socialist) 0.0130 -0.0408 0.0399
(0.0120) (0.0266) (0.0622)
Legal origin (French) -0.0667∗∗∗ -0.0956∗∗∗ -0.3524∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0309) (0.0529)
Legal origin (Germany) -0.0939∗∗∗ -0.1185∗∗∗ -0.6732∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0346) (0.1021)
Legal origin (Scandinavian) -0.0482∗∗ -0.0743∗∗ -0.2458∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0323) (0.1218)
Catholic -0.0014
(0.0011)
Muslim -0.0005
(0.0011)
NO CPM 0.0010
(0.0012)
Constant 0.1902∗∗ 0.1954∗∗ -1.9418∗∗∗ -1.9244∗∗∗
(0.0302) (0.0920) (0.1533) (0.2118)
Number of countries 133 133 133 133
Observations 849 849 849 849
Pseudo R2 0.60 0.55 0.62 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10.
†Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4.2: Remittances and time required to start a business: Pooled OLS and Random-
effects (RE) estimates.
Dependent variable: time required to start a business∗
Variable Pooled OLS (I) Pooled OLS (II) Random-effects (I)† Random-effects (II)
Remittances -0.1498∗∗∗ -0.1011∗∗ -0.3509∗∗ -0.3399∗
(0.0492) (0.0467) (0.1785) (0.1852)
Log GDP per-capita -0.0054 0.0023 0.0557 0.1107
(0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0946) (0.0986)
Education -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0058∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Bussiness freedom -0.0150∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0095∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Urbanization -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0023)
Openness 0.0011∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Legal origin (Socialist) -0.0682∗ 0.0564
(0.0354) (0.0666)
Legal origin (French) -0.0184 0.0227
(0.0309) (0.0744)
Legal origin (Germany) 0.1703∗∗∗ 0.1313
(0.0389) (0.0906)
Legal origin (Scandinavian) 0.0167 -0.0433
(0.0494) (0.1137)
Catholic 0.0011∗∗ 0.0018
(0.0005) (0.0012)
Muslim -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0013
(0.0005) (0.0012)
NO CPM 0.0000 (0.0005)
(0.0005) (0.0012)
Constant 2.4182∗∗∗ 2.4280∗∗∗ 2.2056∗∗∗ 2.0955∗∗∗
(0.1076) (0.0832) (0.2701) (0.2117)
Number of countries 133 133 133 133
Observations 849 849 849 849
R2 0.396 0.371 0.336 0.293
†Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗Length of time is measured in log of number of
calendar days. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics†
Variable name Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Remittances (per Capita) 164.38700 253.9280 0.0085783 3278.427
Log of GDP (in constant US$) 3.655701 0.699582 2.175323 4.935141
Education (school enrollment, secondary (% gross)) 80.74391 27.39928 9.16514 148.8852
Business Freedom 68.42485 15.12071 28.8 100
Urbanization (% of population) 59.58145 22.02652 10.376 100
Openness (% of exports) 42.14135 26.89204 6.802359 225.5611
Catholic (% of total population) 34.07585 37.33502 0 96.9
Muslim (% of total population) 19.49688 33.27627 0 99.7
Protestant (% of total population) 13.02191 23.00406 0 97.8
No CPM (other religions, % of total population) 33.40536 32.85775 0.100003 100
Legal origin (British) 0.2685512 0.4434671 0 1
Legal origin (Socialist) 0.2167256 0.4122569 0 1
Legal origin (Germany) 0.0530035 0.2241726 0 1
Legal origin (French) 0.4110718 0.4923183 0 1
Legal origin (Scandinavian) 0.0506478 0.2194067 0 1
Distance to Frontier (DTF∈ (0, 1)) 0.7343214 0.1727787 0.1389 0.9995
†Data set contains 133 countries; # of observations is 849.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion, Policy Implications, and
Future Research
5.1 Summary
Remittances have become one of the largest international flows of financial resources in the
global economy for the last three decades. For many developing economies, remittances ex-
ceed official development assistance, portfolio flows from financial markets, and even foreign
direct investment. Because of the tremendous size of remittances accompanied with their
stability, counter-cyclicality, and unrequited nature, they should be expected to have signif-
icant political economy effects on the recipient economies. In this dissertation, we focused
our analysis on the relationship between remittances and the quality of institutions.
In Chapter 2, we investigated whether inflows of remittances help or hurt the quality of
domestic governance and tried to identify the potential channel of influence. The econometric
analysis identifies remittances as a potential factor to affect the incentives faced by house-
holds and the government in remittance-receiving economies. With respect to household
behavior, our results indicate that the rise in remittances are associated with an increasing
demand for private goods but a decreasing share of public goods in household consumption.
117
Concerning the government motivation, we find a significant negative association between
remittances and government consumption expenditure. This critical result implies that re-
mittances induce the government to substitute the provision of public goods for remittances.
Our empirical study, therefore, provide evidence of governmental free-riding on public goods
provision in the presence of remittances. The econometric analysis suggests that substitution
of resources occurs in a nonlinear fashion across countries; and leads to higher government
corruption, deterioration of rule and law, and inferior regulatory quality; thereby causing a
loss in public welfare.
Another measure of institutional quality is the extent of financial inclusion in an economy
which we took up in Chapter 3. The banking and financial services are commonly identified
within the nature and category of public goods. Therefore, the availability of such vital
services to a nation′s population efficiently and without discrimination is a major goal of
financial inclusion public policy. We analyzed the impact of international remittances flows
on the demand for deposit instruments and the extent to which such instruments are used to
save money. Our analysis at country level indicates that remittances inflows have an adverse
impact on financial inclusion by causing a significant negative impact on the use of saving
instruments. On the other hand, remittances are found to have no impact on the demand
for such instruments.
Such findings remain robust even when we analyze disaggregated data at the rural level
across countries; no such supports are found for the urban sector, however. These results
suggest that rural regions in developing countries have been continuously facing higher costs
of financial services and deficiency of modern economic and physical infrastructures. Because
of existing financial barriers, people are still unable to access and use financial products
and services offered by formal financial institutions. It is also possible that recipients of
remittances in rural regions are attracted more towards informal methods of finance for
various reasons, thereby causing a decline in the extent of using deposit instruments, or
amount of savings in particular.
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Our third measure of institutional quality is the degree of business environment and reg-
ulatory framework. In Chapter 4, we examined the impact of remittances on the quality of
business regulations by using a variable called the ease of starting a business. The results
provide the evidence that remittances can contribute to entrepreneurial performance in the
recipient economy through their favorable impact on financial institutions and business reg-
ulations. The results suggest that international money transfers generate positive incentives
for both suppliers and demanders of financial services. Such incentives lead to attractive
investment climate and thriving businesses. Though remittances are non-market private
transfers, they are useful resources to broaden the scope of mainstream financial system,
thereby contributing to the goal of inclusive development in the recipient countries.
5.2 Policy implications
In precise terms, the first essay in Chapter 2 shows that net increase in public welfare due to
remittances is lower than potential size. So by worsening the quality of political institutions,
remittances can have an adverse impact on growth and economic development. Similarly,
the second essay in Chapter 3 suggests that remittances deteriorate inclusive finance. This
may impede the goals of poverty alleviation and inclusive development. In contrast to the
negative consequences of remittances observed so far, the analysis in third essay in Chapter
4 illustrates that remittances can broaden the scope of mainstream financial system by their
favorable impact on financial institutions and business environment. Overall, the impact of
remittances on institutional quality is, therefore, ambiguous. This ambiguity arises due to
specific incentives generated by remittances inflows on the particular aspect of institutional
quality under consideration.
The first policy implication of our findings is that active public-private partnership can
be an important mechanism to maximize benefits from remittances and to avoid potential
misallocation of public resources in the presence of remittances. Such collaborative efforts
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can significantly contribute to productive investment, both in private and public sectors. Re-
cently, international organizations, financial agencies, and many governments have increased
their focus on how to channelize flows of remittances through formal financial institutions.
We believe that the results of this analysis are expected to contribute to these global efforts
to redirect remittances inflows from current uses toward empowering households to increase
their access to financial instruments and services. Also, uses of remittances toward this end
are expected to avoid the potential negative consequences of governmental free-riding on
the provision of public goods and services. The rise in remittances has, thus, brought both
opportunities and challenges for the recipient countries in leveraging these financial transfers
for poverty alleviation, entrepreneurial growth, and greater economic prosperity.
5.3 Future research
We suggest a number of potential avenues for future research. First, we used aggregated
data on remittances to analyze their effects on institutional quality. Recently, economists
have emphasized the use of worker′s remittances as the best measure of remittances to draw
valid inferences. It would be interesting to see whether above findings remain robust with
this measure of remittances. Second, it would be important issue to explore what items
or provisions of public goods suffer governmental free-riding by extending our analysis to
incorporate those government expenditures. Third, our panel data analysis in Chapter 2
involves coastal area as an instrumental variable for remittances which is a time invariant
variable. The results would be more realistic and convincing if a time variant instrument
were used instead. Similar instrumental variables strategy is desirable to address the issue
of endogeneity in Chapters 3 and 4 as well. Finally, it would also be useful to identify
and employ a more comprehensive measure of financial inclusion, and a precise measure of
entrepreneurial environment in the analysis.
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